COPA, an Organization in a Changing Environment by Granerud, Asger Sams et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Lobbying the MacSharry Reform 
 
- COPA, an Organisation in a Changing Environment? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A project by: 
Jens Arne Andersen, Asger Sams Granerud,  
     Thomas Falke Mortensen and Iben Rønholt  
Supervisor: Kennet Lynggaard 
  EU1, 5th semester, Fall 2007 
 
 2
…
 3
 
Abstract 
 
It is difficult to asses what role various interest organizations (IO) play in the decision-
making process, let alone trying to comprehend the degrees of influence that these 
organizations have on a specific policy outcome or area. Concerning the Common 
Agricultural Policy, the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations is by 
scholars viewed as the most influential IO within the policy area and amongst IOs in 
general. Over time the lobbying process has become an institutionalized part of the 
decision-making process. This process of seeking influence on EU policy-making, is by 
the authors of the project investigated, with the consequences of an unexpected change in 
process as focal point.  
By use of institutional theory on EU policy-making supplemented with perspectives of 
resource dependence, the features of the MacSharry reform process containing an 
unexpected change is explored. Further, the derived consequences for the IO is analyzed 
by use of theories of organizational institutionalization, concluding that the 
institutionalization of routines and procedures inhibited the capabilities of the 
organization to cope with new and unexpected problems in its environment.     
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1 Introduction 
For as long as the European Union (EU)1 has existed, private interest lobbying has been 
an integral part of the decision-making process. Companies, organisations and 
associations are just part of the actor types that have tried to get their viewpoints 
represented in the decisions taken at the EU level. A shifting balance of power between 
the EU’s institutions has meant that new routes of access and influence opened up for the 
lobbying parties to explore or exploit (Bouwen, 2001; Greenwood, 2003). Over time the 
lobbying process has become an institutionalized part of the decision-making process, 
and due to various factors, it is arguable that the EU institutions would not function 
without these actors (Bouwen, 2001).  
 
When trying to comprehend the role interest organisations (IO) play in the EU political 
system, one must first acknowledge that it is a system of governance, primarily 
characterized by its many levels of decision-making. Depending on the perspective, many 
lobbying strategies can be identified as lower- or higher level IO’s, whose routes of 
lobbying are quite different (Pappi et Henning, 1999).    
Consequently, how the IOs function in the EU political system is a rather complex area to 
address. One only has to consider the discussions between corporatist inspired theories 
and pluralistic inspired ones. Their analytical approaches as well as normative views of 
the role of the IOs, and the results they are capable of reaching, provides important 
variations in the conclusions that can be drawn on the subject.   
Therefore, in trying to achieve a better understanding of the subject matter of IOs on the 
general theoretical level, it is essential to understand the differences that can be identified 
depending on the specific IOs themselves, as well as the type of policy area and decision-
making process that is vital for the specific field of enquiry. A combination of these 
factors determines which category the IOs fall under, for example when it comes to the 
closeness of the relationship and cooperation with the formal EU institutions. 
To sum up, it is difficult to asses what role various IOs play in the decision-making 
process, let alone trying to comprehend the degrees of influence that these organisations 
                                                  
1
 The EU will be used to denote both the EC and the EU, although we are aware that during the MacSharry 
reform took place before the enactment of the Maastricht Treaty. 
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have on a specific policy outcome or area (Kay, 1998; Greenwood, 2003). As Richardson 
(2006) describes it, the overall characteristic of EU decision-making is often attributed a 
certain messiness, meaning that the factors and interests influencing the final policy 
outcome are difficult to locate, due to the amount of informal relations among decision-
makers, IOs, and other stakeholders. 
Never the less, the incorporation of IOs into the EU decision-making process has been 
cultivated over time by the EU, and the Commission in particular, due to the EU 
institutions need for information. Information, which the EU itself has not got the 
resources to develop, hence they must rely on the IOs for help. Subsequently the 
relationship between the EU institutions and IOs has been institutionalised, exemplified 
in the EU comitology. This sort of corporation, as well as being necessary on a technical 
informational level, is also necessary in order to legitimize the highly technocratic work 
of the EU by delivering; input legitimacy through participation, compliance during the 
implementation phase, as well as output legitimacy by increasing the effectiveness of the 
EU policy making (Bouwen, 2001).  
In relation to this, since the early 1980’s many firms have joined Euro-associations. Coen 
(2007) estimates that 1450 formal interest groups are operating at EU-level, which the 
Commission as a general rule consults during the drafting of policies (Richardson, 2006). 
 
According to Bouwen (2001), the different EU institutions are in need of different types 
of information at different stages of the decision-making process, e.g. the Commission is 
in high demand of technical information due to its role as drafter and initiator of policies 
(Bouwen, 2001). The information is then traded for influence on the decision-making 
process, in a process of inter-organisational exchange. The IOs organisational structure 
and the type of information they can provide then determines which EU institutions can 
best be addressed strategically, in order to maximize their influence on a decision-making 
process. A sudden change in the ordinary decision-making process would be expected to 
have consequences for the IOs role in the specific decision-making process, as would any 
break between the cooperation of dependent partners. We will return to Bouwen’s theory 
in chapter 2.1 and 2.2, but first we will introduce an example of such a change in the 
decision-making process. 
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One area of strong corporation between the EU institutions and IOs is the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Kay, 1998). The historic character, or the path dependency of 
the CAP, has meant that the agricultural sector, even though its constituency has been 
shrinking, is still today the largest single post on the EU budget, responsible for more 
than 40% of the annual expenditure. This is an even smaller part than it was in the 1970s 
and ‘80s, where it was in excess of 70% of the total budget which was allocated to the 
CAP (Wallace et al, 2005). It is not surprising that such an important part of the EU, and 
its annual budget, has received a lot of attention from the private interests that have a 
stake in it, either economically, politically or ideologically. Concerning the CAP, the 
Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations2 (COPA) is by scholars viewed as 
the most influential IO within the policy area and amongst IOs generally (Ackrill, 2000; 
Greenwood 2003; Lynggaard, 2005; Wallace et al, 2005; Pappi et Henning, 1999).  
 
In understanding the abilities which IOs play in the EU system, we have chosen to look at 
the CAP and subsequently COPA’s role in influencing it. We have further narrowed this 
area of interest down to being the 1992 reform, also known as the MacSharry3 reform, 
and especially the decision-making process that lead up to the adoption of the reform. 
There were various reasons for the MacSharry reform developing as it did and when it 
did, but in Raymond MacSharry’s own words one of the main internal issues of the CAP, 
was that the previous reforms and their policies “did not attack the underlying problems, 
namely that support through the CAP remains proportionate to the quantity produced; 
this gives a permanent incentive to higher production and intensification.” (Raymond 
MacSharry, AgraEurope, January 25, 1991, P/1). It was among other things this incentive 
for overproduction that provided the motivation for the Commissioner and his reform 
team’s effort to reform the CAP. 
Furthermore the 1992 CAP reform is especially interesting when studying the role and 
possibilities of gaining access that describes COPA in the CAP decision-making system. 
It features an apparent anomaly in the decision-making procedure, an unexpected change 
                                                  
2
 The use of COPA in this project includes both COPA and COGECA. Though formally two organizations, 
their organizational structures as so closely intertwined that a distinction serves purpose for the project. 
3
 Named after the Commissioner that was responsible for it at the time; Raymond MacSharry. 
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that inhibited COPA from lobbying the drafting of the initial reform proposal. The CAP 
reform team isolated itself from the representation of IOs and developed the reform in 
almost complete secrecy (Kay, 1998; Patterson, 1997).  
According to Kay (1998), there had been a team planning a reform of the CAP since 
Raymond MacSharry was appointed Commissioner in 1989. The Commissioner also took 
a deliberate decision to keep the reform plans secret from the public, until December 
1990. Though the reform team allegedly started working on the reform proposal in 
January 1989, it wasn’t until two years later, that the public and COPA got their first 
glance of the text itself, when AgraEurope of  January 18th, 1991, printed selected leaked 
parts from the document. The end result of this process was that on the 31st of January, 
1991, the Commission proposed a reform of the CAP, the discussion paper COM (91) 
100. 
 
This is interesting since the Commission’s cooperation and dependence on interest 
groups possibly has been institutionalized from the beginning of the CAP’s existence. 
Especially the Commission’s need for support and expertise from IOs, when drafting 
legislation, can be perceived as a necessary part of the decision-making process. We are 
therefore interested in exploring what happened to the role of COPA in the reform 
process, when it to some degree was restrained from supplying its input to the 
Commission. To what extent is COPA excluded from the decision-making process when 
its expected access route is cut off. The process of the 1992 MacSharry reform of the 
CAP provides opportunity for an analysis of how a change of the process, might 
influence the effectiveness of the private interest representation during the specific 
drafting of this reform, as well as the continued legislative procedure. This leads us to ask 
the following question: 
 
1.1 Problem Formulation 
“What opportunities did COPA have of influencing the drafting of the MacSharry reform, 
when their usual access to the Commission was cut off?” 
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1.2 Operationalization  
Creating general theories on how interest representation functions in the complex 
decision-making system of the EU is, as already stated, relatively difficult. By narrowing 
our analysis down to one single actor, COPA, as well as one concrete time span, (the 
MacSharry reform process 1989-1992) we wish to be able to grasp the possibilities and 
limitations that were at hand for COPA during the process of the reform.  
In this project we, because of limits of scale, limit ourselves to discussing the channels of 
influence, omitting discussions of the content of the CAP reform, thus not covering 
questions regarding COPA’s relative bargaining power. We thereby only indirectly 
answer the question of COPA’s influence, by evaluating the amount of access that COPA 
is able to gain to the decision-making process and the decision makers themselves. 
Our analysis is developed around an analysis of the supply and demand dependency of 
various goods, and the broader organisational context in which the relationship between 
COPA and the various EU institutions are embedded.  
The theoretical framework for conducting the analysis of the empirical data will be 
constructed by using our working questions, which have been formulated with the aim to 
capture the most relevant elements of the problem area. It is important to stress that our 
aim is not directly to make an assessment on how powerful COPA is or how much 
influence it has. That question will be addressed in our reflections (chapter 6).  
  
1.2.1 Working Questions 
The first working question for analysis is what we note for COPA as the exogenous 
element. It represents the formal EU organisations and focuses on the relationships 
between actors in the EU decision-making system. This question entails the formal and 
informal structures of decision-making, and can be seen as somewhat given as an 
ontological object of interest in any analysis concerning EU-level decision-making. Thus 
our first question is developed with the aim of clarifying how the structural and 
institutional mechanisms influencing COPA’s role in the MacSharry reform can be 
described using theories of policy network, new institutionalism and resource 
dependency. 
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Our second working question focuses on the supply of goods and access to the EU 
decision-making. We have chosen to label it the for COPA endogenous element. Bouwen 
(2001) identifies the IO’s organizational structure as strategically relevant for where in 
the decision-making process the IO might maximize its returns. The theory therefore 
helps to analyse how the organisational structure of the IO is somewhat determining for 
the IO’s ability to provide these distinguished types of information. When translated into 
a working question, this second element for analysis thus concern COPA’s organisational 
structure and institutionalised relations with the formal EU institutions. It is therefore also 
important to include tools that will help us understand the organisational structure of 
COPA, and the internal mechanisms for relating and responding to external changes. This 
is done by introducing theories of organisational institutionalisation.   
 
The two questions will construct and guide the analyses by asking the questions for 
theoretical exploration, outlined below: 
 
1. What are the characteristics of the CAP decision-making system during the 
MacSharry reform process?  
2. What are the characteristics of COPA as an organisation, as well as the 
characteristics of its usual methods of influencing policies? 
 
We sum up the analyses of the two working questions in the final conclusion, which 
hereby answers our overall problem formulation. 
 12
1.3 Methods 
In this chapter we will provide an outline and overview of the methods chosen to answer 
our problem formulation and working questions. The chapter thus provides an overall 
framework for the progress of the project, while briefly discussing the choice of research 
design and theories applied, introduced in the operationalization (chapter 1.2). 
  
1.3.1 Research Design 
We have chosen the case study approach to our aim of developing an understanding of 
interest representation in the EU decision-making system. As Flyvbjerg (2004) explains, 
the notion is that concrete, practical, context-dependent case studies are a method suitable 
for topics, where it has proven difficult to develop general theoretical (context-
independent) knowledge. By using this method we hope to gain a higher level of 
understanding on how interest representation is conducted, through the force of example 
more than through formal generalisation. Our reason for choosing to focus specifically on 
the 1992 MacSharry reform are found in the character of the anomaly leading up to the 
enactment of the reform, which means that this case can be labeled extreme, or at least 
atypical. Such cases often reveal more information because more actors and mechanisms 
are activated in the situation studied (Flyvbjerg, 2004). By aspiring to clarify the deeper 
causes behind our problem rather than describing the symptoms, and how frequently they 
occur, we have chosen to focus on one case chosen for its validity, rather than selecting 
cases emphasizing representativeness. 
 
Consequently, what is relevant in this project is not the external validity, but the analysis 
and discussion of COPA’s opportunity in the specific case of the MacSharry reform. As 
stated in the introduction, on the basis of the general accepted theories concerning interest 
representation in EU policy-making and EU policy-making in general, we wish to 
explore what consequences a specific change in procedure has for COPA in this area.  
This requires a somewhat eclectic project design, as no single existing theory can be 
considered apt or sufficient in explaining the specific case for COPA under the 
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MacSharry reform process. For this purpose we have chosen a deductive approach that, 
drawing on the general theoretical foundation concerning EU policy-making, interest 
representation and organisational logics, fulfills the purpose of providing answers in 
relations to our problem.  
With reference to our somewhat ideographic approach, eclectic deduction does not entail 
reformulating existing theory per say, yet rather reshaping the environment in which the 
existing theories are built, contextualizing for the case at hand. In this respect the 
character of the actual facts of the problem area (or reality) is the important factor which 
stipulates whether or not a theory has any explanatory power, and therefore the 
theoretical arguments derived are confronted in the final analyses rather than sought 
consolidated. The choice of empirical data must therefore be evaluated as to determine 
the degree of validity it achieves. This question is further developed in the limitations 
chapter (5). 
 
1.3.2 Choice of Theory 
The working questions described in chapter 1.2.1 divides our overall problem into two 
dependent working questions; respectively based on the exogenous and the endogenous 
element. This division is made on the basis of the notion exorcized in existing theory of 
interest representation in the EU which treats organisational  factors as relevant to 
decision-making, i.e. organization matters, as well as the somewhat conflicting notion 
that emphasize the role of institutional factors, i.e. institutions matter (Bouwen, 2001; 
Greenwood, 2003). 
 
In most deductive research designs, ontological collectivism will be the goal of the 
research, generating theories generally applicable to the ontological focus of the analyses 
(Bitsch Olsen & Pedersen, 2005). With our situationist problem combined with our 
ideographic research design, the theory will focus on structuring a theory on interest 
representation to fit the specific decision-making process of the MacSharry reform. 
Our theoretical framework and subsequent analyses are, as explained in the 
operationalization (chapter 1.2); structured around the two working questions and the 
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theories introduced are applied ongoing as they will help to conceptualize the relevant 
institutionalised structures on the exogenous level and on the endogenous level. The 
exogenous element discusses the basic notions of network theory, resource dependency 
theory, new institutionalism, as well as a range of different perspectives describing how 
to perceive the decision-making process. Overall the institutional focus of this first part of 
our theoretical foundation covers explanations of the relationship between the actors 
within the policy area of the CAP, and focuses on the demand side of Bouwen's (2001) 
resource dependency theory.  
The organisational element departs from Bouwen’s (2001) definitions of supply of access 
goods and the understanding of how organisational structure might affect COPA’s ability 
to respond and act under changing circumstances, is explained by using concepts derived 
from theories of organisational institutionalism. Below each theory is introduced 
separately. 
   
Network Theory and New Institutionalism  
The exogenous element of this project is approached through theories dealing with the 
EU decision-making process, providing us with an understanding of the context which 
COPA acts under. Subsequently we have chosen to combine this approach with the basic 
notions of network theory, focusing on the characteristics of the CAP through a policy 
network angle. This approach, combined with the insights from the literature of new 
institutionalism, provides us with an overview of the institutionalised rules which 
allegedly structure the repetitive interaction of the actors within the policy network of the 
CAP. Whilst the above mentioned theories do not directly deal with the question we have 
chosen to examine, but instead in mainly descriptive terms explain questions such as why 
policies can either be stable or dynamic, they provide us with insights about the 
relationship between COPA and the formal EU institutions. The purpose of discussing 
these theories is to locate the where, how, and whys of interest representation on the 
institutional and structural level. This can be described as a theoretical localization of 
which entities in the formal institutional layout of the Union are being targeted by the 
IOs, and secondly what informal institutional structures allow for such interaction. 
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A Theory of Access  
The main theory chosen for this subject is Bouwen’s (2001) Theory of Access, selected 
because of its apparent explanatory power in relation to an IO’s ability to lobby. Being 
one of the few theories focusing on intra-organizational causal effects, Bouwen’s theory 
has been chosen knowing that it entails some underlying claims of the interaction 
between interest organizations and EU-institutions during the decision-making process. 
First of all Bouwen’s great emphasis on the effectiveness of the IO in providing the 
relevant information, can to some degree be said to bias the project towards this actor 
based explanation rather than structural. We have sought to remedy this by including the 
above depicted theories of structural relations which work as a supplement to Bouwen’s 
framework. The endogenous element of Bouwen’s theory is elaborated on by introducing 
theories of organizational institutionalism.   
 
Organizational Institutionalization  
This final theoretical approach is introduced through institutional theories of organization 
(Zucker, 1987) and localism in institutional analysis (Suchman, 1995) with the purpose of 
applying insights on how organizational behavior might influence COPA’s ability to act 
under the specific circumstances of our case. These theories focus on the internal 
organisational structure of COPA and introduce concepts that explain the impact of 
institutionalisation and what causes it. Hence it outlines how COPA reacts and adapts 
when a change or conflict arises that is diverging from COPA’s existing institutionalised 
scheme of strategies. 
 
1.3.3 Data 
The data used in the project to analyse the two working questions are largely determined 
by the characteristics of the area. The fact that the reform chosen for analysis took place 
fifteen years ago places certain limitations on the empirical data available, e.g. very few 
actors have an electronic database that stretches back to 1989 and beyond. This project 
therefore mainly relies on secondary sources supplemented by some primary data 
derived, amongst others AgraEurope, which disclose the actual decision making process 
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and COPA’s position towards the reform process. AgraEurope is a weekly report on 
European and international agricultural policy, which although it approaches the CAP 
from a journalistic angle, and though its representativeness can be doubted because of 
this, gives us a degree of exposition of the decision-making process at the time (Bryman, 
2004).  
The advantages of using other researchers as secondary sources are amongst other, cost 
and time reduction, as well as the expected high quality of data analysis. The cost and 
time involved in collecting the required primary data is well beyond the time and budget 
scope of this project, hence using other researchers as sources provides an obvious mean 
for gaining the data (Bryman, 2004). 
Other types of data used in the project are official and private source documents. Such 
documents include press releases, position papers, statements as well as organisational 
charts. This type of data is authentic since its origins are more or less unquestionable, and 
the meaning of the documents is very often clear and comprehensible. The 
representativeness can be doubted though, as both the official and private actors are prone 
to a bias when writing such documents. Individuals writing such documents are likely to 
have a particular point of view they want to get across, and they are rarely as self critical 
towards their own organization as they are towards others, hence the bias (Bryman, 
2004). An issue further emphasized, since some of these documents have been gathered 
through AgraEurope. 
 
It should be noted that difficulties to retain exhaustive information concerning the 
organizational structure of COPA fifteen years ago puts some limits on what we are able 
conclude regarding COPA and its organizational structure. We have therefore chosen to 
make an explorative interview with Ole Klintgaard Larsen, Head of Office in The Danish 
Agricultural Office to address this problem. This interview has not been used as a 
primary source for information concerning COPA’s organisational structure, but has 
solely been used to underline the obtained information from COPA and Clark et al 
(2001).  
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1.4 Philosophy of Science 
As we are well aware, the choices we have made concerning our area of interest, problem 
formulation, choice of theory and empirical data, as well as the methodological approach, 
are all connected to the overall scientific aim of the project.    
This chapter will therefore briefly reflect on a few issues relevant to the outline and 
framework chosen for this project, which all have some sort of relation to the superjacent 
question of philosophy of science.  
 
Initially we would like to outline our overall scientific approach which is inspired by the 
paradigm4 of critical theory5. Without going into detail, this paradigm’s main claims are 
that reality can only be understood subjectively, as the researcher in all circumstances is 
being influenced by such factors as environment and the discourses which each 
individual researchers works under. The epistemology can therefore be labeled modified 
objective, meaning that the empirical data we are able to gather on our case of analysis, 
might not represent the ontological truth of COPA’s role in the MacSharry reform and   
should rather be seen as an aimed objectiveness when basing our conclusion on the data 
at our disposal. Ontologically this has been termed limited realistic as in many 
neopositivist approaches. Reality is real so to speak, and one can explore and collect 
knowledge by conceptualizing it in three ontological domains whereby scientific work as 
a discipline is possible (Nygaard, 2005). This approach can in sum be characterized as 
being rooted in real world observations which leaves out ideal based models for analysis 
because they, in their essence, are closed system theories. Hence our choice of a case 
study, featuring an apparent anomaly which is not captured by traditional theories on 
interest representation, has meant that we have included various approaches covering 
different levels of understanding our field of interest. 
We thus categorize our empirical data with use of existing theories of the non-observable 
mechanisms concerning EU decision-making in general, and the MacSharry reform in 
particular. Critical realists emphasize that all phenomenon’s must be analysed as open 
                                                  
4
 We define “paradigm” broadly, as a basic set of values that controls our actions associated with 
disciplined researches (Nygaard, 2005). 
5
 Especially Critical Realism as formulated by theorists such as Roy Bhaskar.  
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systems where all relevant factors, observable or not, must be included. One can not 
assume his or hers way out of reality so to speak, and as a consequence we might realize 
that our theoretical framework diverts from the empirical evidence of COPA’s role in the 
decision-making process.  
 
Our main theoretical goal is to conceptualize the phenomenon in order to identify the 
possible causal effects, structures and mechanisms, which are necessary for gathering our 
empirical data. This is what we have done in our theoretical work and what is called 
localization and intuitive characterization of the phenomenon (Nygaard, 2005). The 
choice of what kind of theories to include has been conducted with the specific problem, 
the MacSharry reform and COPA, as focal point. This means that all relevant structures 
and mechanisms which can be said to have an impact on the problem area must be 
conceptualized in theoretical discussions (chapter 1.2.1). The choice of specific 
mechanism we have chosen to focus on includes that the overall theoretical framework, 
focusing on COPA, leads us to omit overall perspectives on wider structural issues. The 
focus therefore remains on the actor based explanations, which to some degree narrows 
the scope of our subsequent analysis. 
 
After this preliminary examination of the problem area we are able to concretize our 
gathering of empirical data and empirical experiences in our research design. This 
gathering is usually done by using primary sources whereas secondary sources are being 
used in the intuitive characterization of the subject. However, the size of this project 
places great emphasis on secondary sources.  
 
After completing our empirical description of our area of interest, the information gained 
from chapter 2 is confronted with our empirical data introduced in the preliminary 
analysis (chapter 3.1) where the reform process is introduced. Hereby we seek to 
determine the structures, powers and representation in the context of the MacSharry 
reform and COPA.  
The dualism of the general-specific (EU policy-making - the MacSharry reform process) 
and abstract-concrete (General theory - eclectic theoretical framework) are combined so 
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that we are able to outline as many structures and mechanisms as possible and thereby 
reach a subjectively compelling explanation6 on the problem. First we want to discuss 
and identify the phenomenon of interest representation in the CAP with the purpose of 
conceptualizing our specific field of inquiry, which brings us to the theoretical foundation 
of this project. 
 
                                                  
6
 Which is quite possibly all one can reach, in keeping with the critical paradigm’s trail of thought 
(Nygaard, 2005). 
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2 Introducing the Theoretical Framework 
As already outlined in the chapter above we have chosen to put together an eclectic 
theoretical framework for analysis, divided into two working questions. The first 
question: “The characteristics of the CAP decision-making system during the MacSharry 
reform process”, is studied by introducing theories relating to the question of how the 
interaction between actors in our field of enquiry is structured and has been 
institutionalized over time. 
The second question: “The characteristic of COPA as an organization; as well as the 
characteristics of its usual methods of influencing policies”, is studied by introducing 
theories of organizational logics. 
Both chapters end up with a formulation of theoretically elaborated working questions 
utilizable for the final analyses.  
 
2.1 Policy-making in the EU – a Network Perspective 
The aim of this chapter is to develop an understanding of the relationship between the 
EU-institutions and COPA in the particular circumstances of the MacSharry policy 
process. 
First, the general understanding of EU policy-making is outlined before moving on to the 
more specific description of the relationship between IOs and the EU system as a whole, 
as well as among the individual institutions. Elaborating on this theme, theories of policy 
networks are subsequently introduced before we, in the last part, explore how the insights 
of new institutionalism can help to understand how policy networks actually affect the 
options available for COPA.   
 
2.1.1 Theorizing EU Policy-making – the Decision-making Process 
and Levels of Politics in the EU    
The EU is a complex policy system due to its multinational and neofederal features which 
can be characterized as a system of international governance. The decision-making 
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process, which is normally extremely open for influence by IOs and dominated by 
national political as well as administrative elites, creates an unpredictable and 
multileveled policy-making environment. This environment encompasses a wide range of 
public and private policy actors, making the process of policy-making messy, and 
complicates the construction of reliable descriptions which captures all aspects of the 
policy process as a whole. Due to the patchwork of different policy-making methods 
combined with the different regulatory practices in the member states, and the fact that 
the relationships between the key institutions can be characterised as being in a state of 
flux, the EU can be labelled as institutionally unstable. It is therefore difficult to 
characterise the policy-making system through one grand theory. Instead one has to 
combine theories of bargaining and interest mediation by rational actors with a network 
perspective, emphasising the sometimes loose relations between IOs and EU institutions 
(Richardson, 2006; Wallace et al, 2005).  
Furthermore it can also be appropriate to divide European politics into levels, which 
differs in relation to the types of decisions and subsequently which agents, theories and 
rationalities that are relevant for analysis. Three overall levels can be identified: the 
super-systemic level, the systemic level, and the sub-systemic level. Decisions at the 
super-systemic level can broadly be described as history-making and involves agents 
such as the European Council, member state governments, the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ), and in some cases also the Commission. An analysis of such types of decisions 
would primarily focus on history shaping ideas in connection to treaty negotiations, as 
power is concentrated on few (dominant) actors. The systemic level decisions refer to 
policy setting questions such as decision-making procedures and the distribution of 
decision-making powers. These kinds of decisions often include the Council, COREPER, 
and the Parliament, and can be understood through a mixed focus on political and 
technocratic interests. Finally we have the sub-systemic decisions which are the actual 
policy-shaping decisions dealing with the detailed content of policies. These decisions are 
the ones which network analysis’ explanatory power is often coupled with, and are 
typically also connected with, theories of IO involvement in policy-making (Lynggaard, 
2007). 
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CAP reforms generally have a tendency to become high politics at the super-systemic 
level, as both the 1984 and 1988 CAP reforms show, since they ended up being agreed 
upon at the Intergovernmental Conferences after CoAM was unable to reach an 
agreement (Kay, 1998). Since CAP reform is usually located at the super-systemic level 
the role of IOs is minimised according to theory. By focussing on COPA’s ability to gain 
access to the various policy-making institutions, instead of trying to evaluate the actual 
amount of influence obtained, we aim to cover the area of informal access by discussing 
the relationship between COPA and the various policy-making institutions. Hereby we 
also seek to cover the grey area that exists between the different levels of politics in 
relation to how they work together.   
    
While the level of politics is important for theoretically identifying which mechanisms 
and actors are relevant in understanding how a specific decision-making process has been 
conducted, one must also, in order to understand the role of networks and their 
importance in the final policy outcome, take a closer look at the characteristics of the 
policy process itself. 
Normally the policy process is explained through four stages: The agenda setting, the 
decision-making, the implementation, and the evaluation stage. In the agenda setting 
phase the political problem is identified and the possible solutions are hereafter clarified. 
The following decision-making phase is negotiation between the agents and the selection 
of the proper solution. The following implementing and evaluation phases depend on the 
specific area. The ideal like policy process is consistent when all the phases are run 
through sequentially and all the possible solutions are available, yet in reality things does 
not always develop in accordance to this and the process may start with a solution rather 
than a problem and may even preclude some stages or even start at the second stage 
(Richardson, 2006).  
Taking the importance of the networks and the lack of a stable environment into account, 
some might say that the garbage can model, presented by Cohen et al (1972), is a better 
way to describe the policy process as it emphasizes the notion of uncertainty and 
challenges the traditional perception of the decision-making process. This is underlined 
by the fact that there is a general lack of information about the political actors and their 
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positions in the policy processes are characterised by uncertainty (Richardson, 2006). The 
model can therefore help to enlighten some of the aspects the traditional approach may 
overlook. It is for example argued that the characteristics of the garbage can model of the 
policy process, combined with the notion that officials as well as politicians are interested 
in minimizing the risks of legislating, drives policy-makers towards the use of 
knowledge-based influence of the epistemic communities (chapter 2.1.4) (Richardson, 
2006).  
Introducing this model is not an attempt to replace the traditional and valid policy-
making model. The four stages in the policy process are of course still relevant and 
existing as an ideal theoretical tool. The point is simply to emphasize that the process 
might not be as planned and clear and that the garbage can model might be helpful in 
understanding the relationship between the institutions and the IOs in the following 
analyses. 
 
2.1.2 The Mechanisms of Supply and Demand in Lobbying 
One has to take into account the underlying mechanisms forming the relations between 
the decision-makers on one hand and the private interests such as COPA, on the other, in 
order to strengthen the understanding of the many factors influencing the policy-making 
process. 
Based on insights from administrative science, organizational theory and organizational 
sociology, the relationship between the formal institutions of the EU and the private 
interests is described by Bouwen (2001) as that of inter-organizational exchange and 
dependence. He argues that: (1) neither of the administrative bodies of the EU have the 
resources available to perform sufficient research to develop specific information of 
factors concerning the market under its jurisdiction, and (2) that the distance between EU 
policy-makers and constituents is relative long, consequently inhibiting the policy-makers 
input responsiveness to societal trends, as well as the constituent’s sense of ownership of 
output. The solution to these shortcomings, whether viewed from a rationalist or neo-
functionalist perspective, has led to tight interrelations between the formal institutions 
and the actors capable of providing the information. The information is thus traded by 
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mechanisms of supply and demand as access goods for access to the decision-making 
process. It must be stressed that Bouwen’s theory stops at the point of access to the 
decision-making process due to the difficulties in measuring the relative influence of a 
particular private interest. The available access goods identified are defined by Bouwen 
as:  
 
1. “Expert Knowledge (EK): This access good concerns the expertise and technical 
know how needed from the private sector to understand the market. This kind of 
information is indispensable to develop and evaluate effective EC legislation in a 
particular sector. […] 
2. Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI): This good 
concern the information needed from the private sector to help to define the 
European Encompassing Interest (EEI). In [Bouwen’s] sectoral approach, the 
EEI concerns the needs and interests of a sector in the European economic area, 
i.e. the Internal Market, and the European political and social arena. […] 
3. Information about the Domestic Encompassing interest (IDEI): This access good 
concerns the information needed from the private sector to help to define the 
Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI). In [Bouwen’s] sectoral approach, the 
DEI concerns the needs and interests of a sector in the domestic market and the 
domestic political and social arena” (Bouwen, 2001:7). 
 
As almost all private actors are capable of supplying the three goods in various degrees 
and all EU institutions are in various degrees in demand of all access goods, the concept 
is further developed. Considering the EU institutions, drawing from theories of resource 
dependence, it is possible to identify the most problematic resource; the critical access 
good. This is in economic terms the type of information displaying the best relations 
between high demand and scarce supply.  By exchanging access for access goods the EU 
institutions increase legitimacy and compliance, two aspects very important to the 
continued operation of the institutions (Bouwen, 2001). 
Legitimacy (or lack of) has been a growing issue in studies of the EU since competence 
has been transferred from the national states without a likewise adaptation of transparent 
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mechanisms for democratic control. Legitimacy can be divided in two, input and output 
legitimacy. Input legitimacy refers to the representativity of the issues dealt with and the 
participation of the different parties at EU decision-making level, whereas output 
legitimacy concerns the quality of the decisions made, and how well they function in the 
market. As policy change often happens on the backdrop of evaluation identifying 
shortcomings or conflicts in existing policy, the input legitimacy is represented by the 
institutions capability to continuously evaluate existing policy and commence change 
where needed. The effectiveness of this change of policy, the degree by which the new 
policy solves the problems identified to a satisfactory level, will then determine the 
output legitimacy of the policy, subsequent the decision-makers. Input legitimacy is 
therefore, in Bouwen’s view, closely linked with the two types of encompassing 
information (IEEI and IDEI), as this information is used to gauge public opinion and 
evaluate existing and proposed policies. Output legitimacy is dependent on a high quality 
and quantity of expert knowledge (EK) due to its technical purpose as regulator of the 
market (Bouwen, 2001).  
The final aspect of defining the general dependencies of the institutions is the need for 
compliance in the implementation phase of policy-making, which, as with legitimacy, 
Bouwen divides in two variables, the first being the IO’s ability to control its members’ 
compliance with EU legislation. Secondly, by making the IO part of the decision-making 
process, ownership and responsibility of policy is extended to the IO involved, thus 
decreasing the motivation for contestation in the post-decision-making phase. Again it is 
the encompassing access goods that are relevant for compliance, largely due to the reason 
that they are important for input legitimacy. Whether the members of the IO or the 
individual private interests will exhibit compliance with a policy, is a question of the 
sectors encompassing interest, both on a European and domestic level.  
To sum up, the EU institutions need EK, IEEI and IDEI to increase the level of 
legitimacy of, and compliance with, EU policy.  
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2.1.3 The Demand for Access Goods 
In this chapter we will investigate the demand for access goods of the individual formal 
institutions of the EC. Two important institutions, the ECJ and the Parliament are left 
unaccounted for. This is due to the focal point of this project; to discover COPA’s 
opportunities to influence the MacSharry reform. Though we acknowledge the ECJ as an 
increasingly legitimate target for lobbyist attention, any attempt by COPA to target the 
ECJ would at best result in affecting the Court’s interpretation, but not the legal basis 
itself (Bouwen et McCown, 2007). The same reasoning can be related to us leaving the 
Parliament’s demand of information out, as this particular institution did not have any 
formal decision-making powers in 1992 relating to CAP reform when the reform was 
enacted, besides the right to be heard after the final policy proposal was drafted.    
 
The European Commission 
The Commission takes on two roles in the EU polity, both of them in the character of a 
supranational body promoting European interests in the Community. The first is the 
function of initiator and drafter of legislative proposals (Art. 211(1) EC; Art. 5 EU). The 
second role is the Commissions responsibility for controlling the implementation of 
decisions made by the Council and guardian of the Acquis Communitaire (Art. 211(4) 
EC; Art. 5 EU). The treaty provisions are given the Commission in order to secure the 
continuous functioning and development of the common market from a pan European 
perspective, relatively independent of national interests. 
 
In order for the Commission to fulfill these roles, Bouwen identifies an expressed 
demand of EK and IEEI. Albeit all the formal institutions, as mentioned, are in need of 
all three types of access goods, it is argued that IDEI is the least important for the 
Commission. In this early legislative phase the Commission is only interested in IDEI on 
an ad hoc basis if needing to negotiate with the Council or Parliament (Bouwen, 2001) as 
its distinct function is to promote European, not national interests7. The access good EK 
is adversely in high demand, due to its importance in drafting the highly technical 
                                                  
7
 In case of negotiations in order to reach compromise, IDEI might be considered a crucial access good 
though. 
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legislation of the EC. The more EK represented in the legislation the higher the potential 
output legitimacy, as the goal of the legislation is to adopt the ideas of the treaties and 
provisions made by the Council, while the Commission at the same time must ameliorate 
the impact of the market and the regulative legislation of the actors and organizations 
operating within it (Bouwen, 2001). 
IEEI is needed in order to control and evaluate the existing legislation of the Community. 
Again the issue of the permanent understaffing of the Commission returns. In a 
Community where the legal base, the Acquis Communitaire, presently consist of 
approximately 80.000 pages of law, of which now 27, and in 1992 12 countries had to 
comply, the task of controlling member states’ compliance is enormous. Thus, the 
Commission is in great demand of IEEI with a high level of compliance. Engaging in a 
shared ownership of legislation with associations displaying a high level of internal 
compliance reduces the risk that the members of that association refuses, or seek to avoid, 
to comply with the legislation. At the same time the Commission might increase its input 
legitimacy if the initiation of legislation displays a high level of IEEI. This will increase 
the Commission’s ability to express that it is capable to intercept and react to the IEEI 
(Bouwen, 2001). 
 
The Council 
The Council is the supreme decision-maker and the executive organ in implementing EC 
legislature. The Council is the most inter-governmental institution of the EC, as the 
members of the Council represents their individual national governments and its national 
constituents and has the responsibility to implement legislation and decisions on a 
domestic basis. This generates a strong need for IDEI, in order to evaluate a proposed 
policy’s impact on national constituents and secure compliance. IDEI can therefore be 
identified as the most critical resource for the Council. 
The Council General Secretariat, the neutral administrative body which assists the 
shifting presidencies and secures a continuous progression of Council policy, is driven by 
collective European goals like the Commission. Therefore IEEI is also detected as in 
demand for the functioning of the Council, however, not to the degree as it might be 
claimed critical for the representatives of the MS of the Council (Bouwen, 2001).  
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The two encompassing access goods are also in demand due to what Bouwen defines as 
the Council’s decreasing ability to provide indirect political legitimacy to EU policy-
making (Bouwen, 2001). As representatives of the MS are directly elected and 
accountable in first order elections on national levels, the Council has been the institution 
providing EC policy making with the legitimacy of correlating with national ideas and 
preferences. The encompassing goods, as explained previously, are tightly connected to 
legitimacy, thus responding to important demands of the Council. 
EK is on the contrary only in very limited demand. As the Commission should already 
have carried out sufficient research when drafting the proposal, EK representing national 
interests are only of interest in situations of internal bargaining within the Council. 
 
The following chapter will provide an institutional explanation to how certain sets of 
rules have been created in order to uphold and control the relations and secure the 
sufficient supply of goods to meet the demands of the EU institutions.   
 
2.1.4 Policy Networks; Policy Communities, Issue Networks and 
Epistemic Communities       
When discussing network theory it is important to stress that the dominant type of 
network varies according to the policy area. This shall be understood in the way that the 
content and context of the area defines the type of information required and the level of 
access that e.g. IOs are able to gain. In the EU there are identified two main types of 
networks which establish the continuum of the network approach; issue networks and 
policy communities. These main types will be supplemented with the notion of epistemic 
communities, as this focuses on mobilising experts across sectors and ends up playing a 
defining role in the policy process. The policy community is characterised by a stable 
long-term relationship between a fixed, small numbers of participants with steady 
preferences and beliefs. Through cooperation and negotiation, the interdependent EU 
institutions and IOs share the desire to avoid sudden changes. This type of network has an 
advantage to other types of networks as the great internal consensus provides it with a 
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political power that is far more influential than for example issue networks. Analyses of 
policy communities mainly focus on the sub-sectoral and the exchange relationships 
which could be identified at these levels. This kind of relatively simple analysis of the 
policy-making system as a negotiated environment with a very limited number of groups 
participating in frequent high-quality interaction is described as hierarchical, however, 
with a great deal of common values for all participants. The community needs to be 
perceived as a positive-sum game if it is to persist and therefore the participants need to 
accept the legitimacy of the outcome, hence the importance of consensus (Blom-Hansen, 
2007).  
This picture of policy-making characterized by tightly knit policy communities has been 
challenged by the increasing numbers of stakeholders trying to participate in the process 
of setting the agenda and shaping the development of policies. A more loosely organised 
and thereby less predictable policy process stressing dynamics more than stability must 
also be taken into consideration when discussing the network approach. The continuously 
growing number and ranges of interest groups all demanding participation, has reduced 
the policy community characteristics and its stable corporatist model as the dominant 
paradigm within the EU (Richardson, 2006). Instead emphasis has been placed on the 
more loosely organised issue networks. Through this perspective the theoretical focus of 
network analysis has been altered to usually only include a specific case and consists of a 
larger number of actors that does not share basic values. Conflicts are therefore more 
likely than in the policy community. Access as well as contacts fluctuate and the basic 
relationship between participants is characterized as merely consultative and a zero-sum 
game (Blom-Hansen, 2007).    
 
These two different network approaches stressing respectively stability and dynamics, are 
suitable for describing different policy areas which, vary over time in terms of structure. 
An example of this is the shift towards softer policy instruments in the EU which has 
subsequently meant an intensification of consultation of stakeholders, although the 
character of EU policies being not simply the outcome of interstate bargaining but also a 
great number of nested games, coalition building and a constant process of bargaining, 
which all in all makes the identification of either kind of network difficult.     
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A generic view of the models can also be introduced though. On the one hand we have 
the widening of the organisational participation, on the other hand, a narrower 
technocratic specialisation in the complex world of modern politics pointing towards a 
more moderate understanding of the variation, as well as the importance of policy 
networks for policy development (Richardson, 2006). Instead communities of experts, the 
so called epistemic communities, can be emphasized as a consequence of the EU policy-
making being characterised by consisting of actors operating under uncertainty. An 
epistemic community can thus be defined as a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competences in a domain as well as an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within this particular domain. 
Although being from different backgrounds and disciplines, these professionals share; 1) 
a set of normative and principled beliefs providing a value based rationale for the social 
action of community members; 2) shared causal beliefs derived from their analysis of 
practises contributing to a central set of problems in their domain, and which serve as the 
basis for elucidating the various linkages between possible policy actions as well as 
wanted outcomes; 3) a shared notion of validity through internally defined criteria for 
validating knowledge in their specific field of expertise; and 4) a common policy 
enterprise, being a set of practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
professional competence is directed must be shared before speaking of a systemic 
community (Richardson, 2006). 
Epistemic communities are important because of the logic of risk averse politicians trying 
to secure that every step of the policy process has been achieved by including all the right 
persons at the right committees and the right institutions, and by doing so, making sure 
that no one can be blamed if things go wrong. It would thus be surprising if, for instance, 
the Commission officials actually formulating policy proposals did not engage in similar 
behaviour and built coalitions in favour of its own interests in policy changes. By 
involving relevant state and non-state actors the Commission can advance its own 
leverage towards the Council and the Parliament and thereby maintain its position as an 
independent policy-maker. The information and ideas which are necessary for this to 
happen can for example be provided by an epistemic community (Richardson, 2006). 
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Network theory therefore provides an understanding of politics as a complex and difficult 
process characterised by fragmentation and specialised sub-systems. Interdependencies 
prevail due to the need for coordinated policy action through networks of separate 
organisations in which interest groups such as COPA bring their specific abilities into 
enabling the EU to function more effectively.  
The frustrations connected to the network approach concerns the lack of agreement on 
how to define policy networks and the problems with the explanatory power of the 
concept (Blom-Hansen, 2007). The strength of the concept seems to lie in its descriptive 
value and one has to accept that the networks approach is but one component of most 
explanations regarding EU politics. Combining this approach with e.g. theories of 
resource dependence, can help to remedy these shortcomings. In the section below 
arguments are presented as to how institutional theory makes it possible for network 
theory to move beyond mere description.  
 
2.1.5 An Institutional Approach to the Network Analysis  
New institutionalism (institutionalism) is a multidisciplinary discipline covering various 
fields of social science. It is in itself not a consistent framework but rather a set of related 
analytical ideas which are bound together by the notion that; “The organisation of 
political life makes a difference” (Blom-Hansen, 2007: 43). In an article from 1997, 
Blom-Hansen argues that the use of a model, constructed on the basis of new 
institutionalism, can be used to move the policy network analysis beyond mere 
description of politics in modern societies (Blom-Hansen, 2007). Below we present his 
thesis and discus how this approach can help our understanding of the role of networks in 
the MacSharry reform process. 
  
A basic distinction based on the underlying model of human behaviour must be made 
between a sociological and economic variant or school of thought of institutionalism, 
although a range of different strands can be identified. (Blom-Hansen, 2007).   
Whereas sociological institutionalism operates with the notion of a homo sociologicus as 
the micro-foundation, economic institutionalism operates with a homo economicus. 
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Basically these two different strands of institutional theory are incompatible because of 
their conflicting micro-foundations. Acknowledging this difference, we have chosen 
mainly to use the economic reasoning as we find it better suited for our specific purpose 
and in line with Bouwen’s overall approach, and as the general weaknesses explained 
above concerning network theories, do not seem to be remedied by combining it with 
sociological institutionalism (Blom-Hansen, 2007). 
 
The basic notion of (economic) institutionalism in Blom-Hansen’s (2007) terms is rules 
constraining action in repetitive, interdependent relationships. The term, rules, 
encompass formal rules, relating to for example the distinct procedural rules in a 
committee, as well as informal rules relating to conventions or codes of conduct which 
supplement formal rules. Through these rules social interaction is structured by enabling 
actors of the community to calculate the plausible choices of the others actors and by the 
threat of sanctions imposed by other actors in case of non-compliance. Importantly, 
knowledge of these rules must be broadly shared by all members of a community for this 
to be valid. 
Seven classes of rules can be listed, covering the relations between participants, actions, 
positions and outcomes, thus enabling us to construct a formal network model: 
1. Position rules - Which specify a set of positions and how many participants hold 
each position.  
2. Boundary rules – Which specify how participants are chosen to hold these 
positions and how participants leave these positions. 
3. Scope rules – Which specify the set of outcomes that may be affected and the 
external inducements and/or costs assigned to each of these outcomes. 
4. Authority rules – Which specify the set of actions assigned to a position at a 
particular node. 
5. Aggregation rules – Which the decision function to be used at a particular node to 
map actions into intermediate or final outcomes. 
6. Information rules – Which authorize channels of communication among 
participants in positions and specify the language and form in which 
communication will take place.  
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7. Pay-off rules – Which prescribe how benefits and costs are to be distributed to 
participants in positions. (Blom-Hansen, 2007:45) 
 
Blom-Hansen argues that this agenda can be seen as: “a universal set of necessary 
variables for the construction of formal decision models where outcomes are dependent 
on the acts of more than a single individual” (Blom-Hansen, 2007: 45) and thus relevant 
for our task of describing the structures and mechanisms relevant for understanding the 
opportunities of COPA. Policy networks are in this perspective basically defined as 
informal rules governing the interaction between the EU and organized interests. Being 
of general nature, these rules are seen as institutions in the sense that they are known to 
most actors and structure the repetitive interactions of the networks. This can further be 
outlined by combining the rules listed above with the network model of policy 
communities and issue networks, hereby making a general outline of how policy 
networks may be understood as the informal institutional rules (table 1).  
 
It is especially interesting for us to look at the boundary, position, authority and 
information rule because all these relate to the question of access and intermediation 
more than to influence, and thus further develops our understanding of the exchange of 
information between COPA and the EU-institutions in the policy area of the CAP 
through establishing which informal rules are governing this interaction. 
The general differences between the two focal points of policy networks attributed to the 
position and boundary rule can be elaborated by comparing actors in policy communities 
to members of a club, all recognizing each others status. In issue networks the option of 
participating is not limited by any rule and almost everyone with an interest in the matter 
can thus become a part of it. In policy communities the decision-making is based on co-
operation and unanimity, which defines the authority and aggregation rule. In contrast, 
issue networks are dominated by actors trying to force their specific interests into the 
decision-making process, yet dominant actors make decisions unilaterally as unanimity is 
only rarely possible. 
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Table 1: Networks as 
Institutionalized Rules 
  
 Policy Community Issue Network 
1. Position Rule  Members Affected Interests 
2. Boundary Rule Mutual Recognition Free Entry and Exit 
3. Position Rule Policy Policy 
4. Authority Rule Cooperation Intrusion 
5. Aggregation Rule Unanimity Unilateral decisions by 
dominant actors 
6. Information Rule Exchange of Expertise and 
Judgment 
Expressions of Opinion 
7. Pay-off Rule Influence Being Heard  
 
        (Blom-Hansen, 2007:46) 
 
Interestingly, relating to Bouwen’s (2001) theory of resource interdependence, the 
information rule suggest that information is a commodity exchanged for other 
commodities, for example influence (or maybe access), in policy communities. Whereas 
actors in issue networks only air their point of view without any guarantee as to whether 
these will be listened to (Blom-Hansen, 2007). It is therefore important whether the CAP 
during the MacSharry reform process was most comparable to an ideal policy community 
or an ideal issue network.   
  
The institutional explanation consists not only of rules as the above described, but must 
be combined with a model of the specific actors included. Our focus is on the rational 
perspective of the micro-foundation equal to the perspective of economic 
institutionalism, though actors in network analyses are normally institutions and IOs, and 
not individuals. As Blom-Hansen argues: “In the case of individual actors, capability of 
strategic decision-making is often a trivial assumption” (Blom-Hansen, 2007: 47). Blom-
Hansen (2007) continues to argue that composite actors, such as COPA, may fruitfully be 
understood as unitary actors capable of strategic decision-making because such actors in 
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a game-theoretical point of view rely on institutional arrangements, which means that 
collective binding decisions can be made. This leads us to our second working question: 
the characteristics of COPA as an organization, as well as the characteristics of its usual 
methods of influencing policies. Before that the central points from the institutional 
variable are summarized below, outlining our working questions for the collection of 
empirical data and subsequent analysis. 
 
2.1.6 Summary 
When commencing with the analyses it is important to consider the type of reform we are 
dealing with, placing it on the level of politics where it can best be identified. Hereafter 
we are capable of establishing and explaining how the decision-making procedure might 
be affected by the institutionalised rules governing the policy network of the CAP, and 
make an assertion as to which type of access goods that the EU institutions are in demand 
of at different nodes in the decision-making process.  
The conclusions which are drawn on these subjects will further help to qualify the 
description of the relationship between actors in the policy area of the CAP during the 
MacSharry reform process. This is done by combining the insights from the theories with 
empirical data on how the process has developed. We thereby address our first working 
question by focusing on the following theoretically derived points of analysis. It should 
be noted that several of the points overlap and need to draw on each other in order to 
answer the questions: 
 
• What level of politics is the MacSharry reform situated at? 
• By use of the institutional rules of the policy network, is the CAP to be described 
as a policy community or an issue network? 
• What types of access goods are in demand by the EU-institutions? 
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2.2 The Organizational Element – Supply of Access Goods 
Turning to our second working question - The characteristics of COPA as an 
organisation, as well as the characteristics of its usual methods of influencing policies - 
the aim of this chapter is to develop the necessary concepts concerning the supply of 
information from COPA towards EU policy-makers and thus supplement our arguments 
from the above chapter with empirically utilizable insights at the micro-level. These 
insights are taken from Bouwen’s theory already introduced combined with the insights 
derived from Zucker (1987) and Suchman’s (1995) theories, all relating to the 
organisational aspect of gaining access.  
 
2.2.1 The Supply of Access Goods 
When trying to analyze the supply of access goods an actor, i.e. organisation, can provide 
it is important to consider two aspects; (1) the actor’s choice of organizational form and 
(2) the relationship between these organizational forms and the provision of access goods 
(Bouwen, 2001). Our case concerns COPA, an association of European business 
interests, why other organizational forms will not be addressed.  
 
The Organizational Form and the Provision of Access Goods 
The organizational form of interest representation is the most important variable that 
influences the quantity and quality of the access good that can be provided (Bouwen, 
2001). Individual action will due to the limited layers of the organization normally equal 
the ability to supply a high quality and quantity of the access good EK. However, 
European associations represent a wider area of interest and multiple layers of decision-
making which will reduce their efficiency in providing specific expertise. The quality of 
the access good provided to the institutions is linked to the credibility of the provision. 
Credibility is the crucial property of the private interest vis-à-vis the EU institution and 
credibility is earned by consistently providing a high quality of access goods. The term 
connotes the reputation of the provider of the access goods in the institutions. As in 
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everyday business-consumer relations, the consumer of goods will, all other things being 
equal, in a scenario of multiple suppliers, choose the supplier with the most credible track 
record. According to Bouwen (2001), the same goes in the relationships between 
suppliers and consumers of access goods; COPA and the EU institutions. Credibility is 
therefore fittingly described as a derived access good as it derives from the quality of the 
ordinary access goods, and it is in equal demand across the three institutions. 
Also the efficiency of the provision of goods (e.g. speed and flexibility) is important. 
Two variables can thus be outlined which influence the association’s efficiency in 
supplying access goods:  
 
1- “The number of layers (firm – national association – European association) 
in the organizational form. 
2- The complexity of the internal decision-making process of the organizational 
form.” (Bouwen, 2001: 18) 
 
The two variables of efficiency relates to the general organizational construction of 
COPA. The more organizational layers, the more actors involved in the internal decision-
making process, hence the less efficient will the process of transferring information from 
ground to top level be. EK will therefore not be the key competence of a multi-level 
organizational structure with a complex decision-making procedure. The amount of 
quality and quantity of the two types of encompassing information are on the contrary 
highly dependant on influence by many actors and interests in the process of transferral. 
As implied in the term encompassing, these types of information reflect an aggregation of 
knowledge of as many interests as possible on the specific area of interest. National 
associations should in consequence be able to supply a high quality and quantity of IDEI, 
while Euro-associations should have IEEI as a key competence (Bouwen, 2001).  
Another aspect which can further supplement this theory comes from the insights of 
organisational institutionalism. 
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2.2.2 The Institutionalization of the Organization 
This section will provide a way for a theoretical framework to understand how; a) 
COPA’s organisational structure and strategies have become institutionalised and; b) how 
COPA’s organisational structure reacts or adapts when a problem arises that does not fit 
within COPA’s existing institutionalised scheme of strategies. 
Zucker (1987), provides theoretical tools to describe a), through a varying combination of 
environment as institution and the organisation as institution. Suchman (1995) provides 
the tools to describe b). Both are introduced below. 
 
To begin with, Zucker defines two elements of institutionalisation in organisations as; “a) 
a rule-like, social fact quality of an organized pattern of action; and b) an embedding in 
the formal structures, such as formal aspects of organisations that are not tied to 
particular actors or situations” (Zucker, 1987: 444). These two elements are referred to 
as routines and formal structures and both these elements spread easily to newcomers in 
the organisation. The elements are resistant to change hence persist over long periods of 
time without further justification or elaboration. Still, the structures that are embedded in 
the organisations formal procedures have more continuity over time and are more readily 
institutionalised than the informal social routines and organised patterns. So even though 
both elements are important in determining how the institutionalisation occurs, the 
processes stemming from the formal structures are easier to transmit to newcomers than 
the informal routines. 
The question that begs to be asked is why the organisations “allow” this 
institutionalisation to happen. Zucker has an explanation which also present the problem 
that institutionalisation causes: “The resulting stability [of the institutionalisation] 
increases effectiveness when it is linked to goals of the organization by creating 
"routines" that reduce search and evaluation costs. But stability decreases effectiveness if 
more efficient ways of organizing are ignored, often because they are literally not 
perceived” (Zucker, 1987: 446). Routines and formal structures therefore create stability 
and effectiveness at the cost of increased rigidity, hence potential inefficiency. 
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The main research into understanding the source of the institutionalisation is further 
divided into subcategories. Two of the main dimensions are referred to by Zucker (1987) 
as the environment as institution and the organisation as institution.  
Environment as institution is, simply put, when forces external to the organisation 
determine the institution that the organisation has to adapt to. This could be linked to 
state influence which makes the law the organisation has to abide by (Zucker, 1987). In 
our case it would be seen as the Commission creating the environment that COPA has to 
adapt to. The result is that organisations that function in institutional environments, in 
order to conform to the specifications of their sector, must develop informal routines and 
formal structures that adhere to these demands (Zucker, 1987). The organisation is seen 
as passive and simply reacts to the environment as it is. The locus of institutionalisation is 
generated external to the "target" organization. These institutional elements operate 
independently of the organisation. Even if perceived as unfair and not supported by the 
individual actor, he will still behave as if he supported them (Zucker, 1987). Hence, 
according to the theory, individuals do become institutionalised even if they to a degree 
consciously oppose said institutionalisation. 
Organisation as institution on the other hand sees the organisation itself as being the 
source of institutionalisation, actively generating and reproducing the institutional 
elements. It is the organisational routines and formal structures that create the 
institutionalisation as opposed to adapting to them (Zucker, 1987). The specific formal 
structure of COPA and the daily business routines in the organisation is what creates the 
institutionalisation of the organisation and subsequently the environment through the 
organisation. Zucker defines three factors that in combination determines the degree of 
institutionalisation of organisational routines: ”(a) the degree of explicit codification in 
the form of work rules, formal promotion hierarchies, and other types of formalization of 
the specific routine; (b) the length of the history of the structure/task; and (c) the degree 
of embeddedness in a network of structures/tasks, such that change in one part would 
make inevitable changes in other structures/tasks with which it is interdependent” 
(Zucker, 1987: 456). Of these three factors (a) relates to the formal structures, so does (c) 
though here the formal structures could reach beyond the organisation itself to other 
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elements that it has a developed interdependency with. The last factor, (b), is perhaps also 
the hardest to define precisely and relates to the informal routines. 
Though Zucker’s two dimensions of institutionalisation at first glance seem mutually 
exclusive, the essence in reality lies somewhere in between. Both are important as an 
element of explaining the source of institutionalisation even if the degree of importance 
varies from policy area to policy area and case to case. In our specific case the 
Commission’s break in procedure forces COPA to react, but how COPA reacts is limited 
by the internally risen routines and the organisations formal structure, which depend on 
the length of COPA’s institutional history, a factor independent from the Commission’s 
present action. The institutionalisation of the working procedures of an organization 
should therefore be viewed as interplay between the environment and the organisation as 
the institutionalising elements.  
It should be noted that it is inherently difficult to go beyond these theoretical points and 
empirically measure exactly what creates institutionalisation in an organisation (Zucker, 
1987). 
 
2.2.3 The Organization’s Responses 
Having set the framework for how and why organisations become institutionalised, we 
move on to the second issue how b) COPA’s organisational structure reacts or adapts, 
when a problem arises that does not fit within COPA’s existing institutionalised scheme 
of strategies. Suchman (1995) helps us explain.  
First we are to understand why problems arise, and since actors of social systems rarely, 
if ever, enjoy perfect exchange of information among each other, problems simply do 
occur, as described in chapter 2.1, due to the decision-making procedures in the EU being 
extremely messy. The type of problem is dependent on a lot of variables, most 
importantly how novel a problem it is. The novelty of a problem is defined by how much 
it departs from expected patterns and established models (Suchman, 1995). Some novel 
problems will be easily resolved by a simple extrapolation of the existing institutional 
scheme. Other novel problems do not fit within the organisation’s knowledge of pre-
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existing institutional schemes and when this happens the organisation may do one of 
three things: 
1. Ignore the problem. 
2. Misconceive the problem, resulting in inadequate ‘treatment’. 
3. Acknowledge the problem and search for an appropriate response.  
(Suchman, 1995) 
 
It seems likely that organisations will most readily acknowledge a problem when it: 
1. Is large or recurrent. 
2. Affects central or vocal constituencies. 
3. Arise in areas designated as culturally problematic.  
         (Suchman, 1995) 
 
For institutionalisation to take place the problem must be dealt with in a manner that 
ensures the response becomes part of the institutional scheme of solutions. If it is 
identified as a unique problem, and thereby possibly dealt with in an ad hoc manner, 
chances are larger that the response will not be institutionalised (Suchman, 1995). The 
reason for this is, as explained by Zucker (1987) above (chapter 2.2.2), that formal 
structures are more readily institutionalised than the alternatives embedded in the 
informal routines. What is of importance is a) where the problem arose, b) which type of 
problem it is, c) if COPA recognised it, d) how COPA recognised it, and e) how COPA 
addressed it. 
 
It is to be expected that the problem for COPA of being excluded from the process is both 
large and central. They are an interest organisation so their purpose is to lobby for their 
cause and hence to be included in decision-making processes involving the CAP. This is 
not the same as saying that COPA did acknowledge it or that if they did, began a search 
for an appropriate response. 
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2.2.4 Summary 
The above frameworks of Bouwen (2001), Zucker (1987) and Suchman (1995) has 
provided us with a number of tools and the overall framework to address how COPA 
functions organisationally, as well as how COPA usually supplies its access goods. It has 
also provided us with tools to address what might happen when COPA is forced to react 
outside its set of institutionalised responses. In order to investigate our problem 
formulation and our second working question we need to empirically address the 
following theoretical points derived from chapter 2.2. It should be noted that several of 
the points overlap and need to draw on each other in order to explain the issues: 
 
• How can the formal structures and hierarchical organisational form of COPA –be 
understood by using our theories of organisational institutionalism? 
• Which type of access goods does COPA supply and how does that correspond to 
the EU institutions demand for access goods? 
• Has COPA’s internal decision-making procedures and routines been 
institutionalised? 
• Have COPA’s responses become institutionalised through routines and formal 
structures? 
• If the MacSharry reform anomaly falls outside COPA’s institutionalised set of 
responses, how do they respond to it? What options do they have due to their 
organisational structure and the current institutional political framework? 
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3 Analyses 
 
This chapter is divided into three subchapters. The first one, chapter 3.1, is intended to 
give the reader an overview of the events of the MacSharry reform process, in accordance 
to our theoretical criteria. The second chapter 3.2 departs from our first working question 
and the theoretical summary in chapter 2.1.6. It analyses the rules and institutions that 
surround the MacSharry reform, and thereby describes the environment that surrounds 
COPA. The third and final chapter 3.3 relates to our second working question, and 
analyses how COPA reacts based on its organizational structure, in the environment that 
surrounds the MacSharry reform. 
 
3.1 Introducing the Reform Process 
Before introducing the MacSharry reform process, called “the most significant reform of 
the policy since its inception 30 years previously in 1962” (AgraEurope, 1992: 3), it is 
important to understand its origin and the pressures and political changes that made it 
evolve. 
In the years following World War II, due to a time with general shortage of supply, the 
development supported the build up of surplus stock. In the start 1980s the global market 
of agricultural products had seen critical scarcity of agricultural products why the EU, in 
an attempt to exploit the improved opportunities of exports, had increased incentives for 
overproduction. At the end of the decade the world market had somewhat recovered, yet 
farmers’ incentives to overproduction remained.  
In the years leading up to the reform process, pressures for a reform of the CAP had 
arisen from both internal and external conditions. The period was influenced by the 
ongoing GATT negotiations and the general pressure at the world market. The Uruguay 
Round of GATT had since 1986 still not been agreed upon, continuously increased 
demand for a solution from both the EU and the USA, as neither parts were satisfied with 
the current situation (Patterson, 1997).  
Internally, with the constant increase in production, the choice was either to expand the 
budget substantially or reform the basic principles of agricultural subsidies. The 
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Stabilizer Programme was introduced in 1988 to control the threatening budgetary crisis, 
but had proven insufficient. 
Furthermore, the development within the EU with the Single European Act (SEA) from 
1985 placed the environment at the agenda and introduced new environmental standards, 
which affected the agricultural sector. The development towards the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992 and a monetary and economic union also placed pressure on the CAP as the system 
of monetary compensation amounts would disappear (Patterson, 1997).  
 
In the period 1989-1990 a reform team in the Commission under Ray MacSharry began a 
preparation for a reform of the CAP. Few people, even inside the Commission, knew of 
this hence the initial groundwork for the reform was developed in secrecy without 
influence from COPA or any other interests groups (Kay, 1998). On the 6th of December 
1990 a "secret" proposal paper was produced. The paper identified the problems of too 
high prices and overproduction and recommended solutions to the problem. As Ray 
MacSharry expressed: “nothing short of a fundamental reform of the CAP would be 
enough to put the EC's agriculture policy back on a rational footing” (AgraEurope, 
January 25, 1991, E/1). 
Officially the December 6th paper does not exist although various parts of it were later 
leaked why the Commission’s interest in reforming the CAP became known in general. 
COPA did not know that such a proposal was being worked on: “Aides at COPA confirm 
that they had been unaware that a team in the Commission had been constructing reform 
plans for the CAP, including DIPs [direct income payment], through 1990” (Kay, 1998: 
110). However, due to the strict tone of the paper it was suppressed, though it remains 
important since it laid the foundation for the reform initiative (Agra Europe, January 18, 
1991, E/ 2-7).  
At College meetings on the 4th and 9th of January 1991 the initial reform ideas were 
discussed, and when COPA and the general public became aware of these plans the full 
College of Commissioners where whisked away to a weekend seminar. This gave the 
Commission peace which in Kay’s words meant that; “[a]nother effect of the weekend 
seminar tactic was to insulate the debate from the farm lobbies” (Kay, 1998: 110). 
Simply put, what really hampered COPA’s ability to gain access to the Commission was 
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that; “COPA was not consulted on the decision of the Commission to propose a CAP 
reform or the substance of the reform proposal” (Kay, 1998: 155). MacSharry presented 
an outline for the reform to which he had almost unanimous support from the 
Commission. There were some internal disputes though, as the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and Denmark felt their farms were being overlooked due to prioritizing of 
small farms. The discussions at the three meetings lead to the enactment of the discussion 
paper COM (91) 100 on the 30th of January 1991, encompassing the Commission’s view 
on the CAP reform. One day after, the paper was presented to the Council.  
Its main content was the proposed radical price reductions in certain key sectors balanced 
by direct compensation to farmers. The paper was discussed in the CoAM the 4th of 
February. COPA’s President Constantin Heereman took the opportunity to present 
COPA’s concerns regarding farmers’ conditions due to the international and economic 
development to the President of CoAM, Luxembourg Minister Rene Steichen 
(AgraEurope, January 25, 1991, E/4). COPA acknowledged that progress and 
development in the agricultural sector was necessary, but still expressed in the position 
paper from May 1991, that the discussion paper, COM (91) 100; that "given the 
significant cut in farmers incomes in 1990 and further inflation, Community farmers 
cannot tolerate new direct or indirect cuts in farm prices during the farm price review for 
1991/92 in anticipation of the adjustments to be made to the CAP"(AgraEurope, February 
14, 1991, E/4).  
Two weeks later COM (91)100 was sent to the Parliament to let them express their 
opinion, even though they had no real influence on the process. It was still met with some 
mixed emotions; some even claiming the proposal should be withdrawn and reformulated 
(AgraEurope, February 15, 1991, P/5). 
On 11th of July 1991 the original discussion paper, COM (91) 100, was reissued as a 
proper proposal, officially starting the Councils involvement in the reform process. The 
document was renamed to COM (91) 2588. The content is virtually the same as the first 
discussion paper only with few modifications, even retaining the same heading (Kay, 
1998). The paper outlines the current problems in the various sectors and concludes that 
"the reductions in prices needed to re-establish market balance cannot be achieved 
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unless accompanied by significant compensation measures not connected with the volume 
of production"(AgraEurope, February 14, 1991, E/2).  
On November 19th CoAM held the first meeting where they seriously discussed the 
reform proposal COM (91) 258. It was made quite clear that if the Council was not 
prepared to respond positively to the changes, their only alternative would be a politically 
humiliating increase in the agricultural support. Furthermore, economic crises as those in 
1981-83 and 1986-87 would possibly recur (AgraEurope, February 15, 1991, P/2-3).  
The 30th of May 1992 the CoAM agreed on the MacSharry reform, (EEC) No. 1765/92. 
Prior to this the CoAM held meetings that lasted from the 18th to the 22nd of May and 
before hand there were discussions as to whether it was necessary to reshape the reform 
proposal suitable to the new international commitment due to the GATT negotiations 
(AE, January 24, 1992, P/1).   
The decisive reform breakthrough was Germany’s change in position to be pro the reform 
due to the unification, which placed the country with a new range of economic and 
political issues that made it more willing to accept changes. The final reform was not as 
drastic as the reflection paper. The original idea remained the same, but the price cuts 
were not so drastic and the compensatory payment not so complex. The compensation 
was made more universal so it would also ameliorate farmers in e.g. UK and Denmark. 
Germany and the UK were able to ensure all farmers compensation for loss of income; in 
exchange large farms would set aside 15 % of the arable land from production. The 
MacSharry reform was a shift from non-transparent consumer subsidies to transparent 
taxpayer subsidies and a direct compensation programme was introduced.  
COPA responded to the reform by stating that: “the reforms agreed will rise spending 
and cause serious management and control problems” and “COPA wants a guarantee of 
full and lasting compensation for the income losses caused by the reform, coupled with 
adequate budget provision to guarantee the functioning of the system. The costs of 
managing the compensation should not be borne by farmers” (AgraEurope, May 29, 
1992 E/1). 
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3.2 Analysis of the Exogenous Elements 
The chapter provides an analysis of how the content and context of the MacSharry reform 
influenced the possibilities for COPA to gain access to the policy process during the 
drafting procedure. This is done by establishing how these matters influenced the formal 
and informal structures of the relationship between actors in the policy network of the 
CAP. Subsequently it leads to our analysis of how various demands for information of 
the formal institutions have been shaped, making it possible to conclude how structures 
and demands have either limited or provided COPA with possibilities of gaining 
influence through access to the decision makers.  
Hereby our theoretically derived points of analysis (cited below) are sought answered, 
enabling us to turn to our second working question which analyses how COPA adapted to 
the circumstances of the MacSharry reform established in this analysis: 
 
• What level of politics is the MacSharry reform situated at? 
• By use of the institutional rules of the policy network, is the CAP to be described 
as a policy community or an issue network?  
• What types of access goods are in demand by the EU-institutions? 
 
3.2.1 The Content and Context of the MacSharry Reform 
The CAP can be described as chronically imbalanced in terms of demand and supply 
mechanisms in the market of agricultural products. The fundamental problem of the CAP 
is that it creates incentives for farmers to increase production more than the demand can 
absorb thus leaving the EU countries to resort to costly solutions of managing 
overproduction and disposing of excess stock of farming products. In spite of these facts, 
the EU policy-makers were once again capable of avoiding a radical reform of the CAP 
in terms of defending fundamental policy principles (Skogstad, 1998). According to 
Daugbjerg (1997) this can be explained by the organisational structures of the CAP, 
which biased the reform process towards a moderate reform. Hence we, in our analysis of 
the levels of the policy process, turn our attention towards the three systemic levels. The 
detail-oriented and technocratic nature of policy reforms such as the MacSharry reform is 
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characterized as sub-systemic. Yet, the difference in rationale on the different levels can 
simply put, be described as whether or not political and scientific ideas supplement the 
technocratic solutions to the policy issue at hand. We know that, among others, scientific 
pressures were part of triggering the MacSharry reform in that the environmental 
concerns were to be included (chapter 3.1). Also political ideas had formed over the years 
as especially Jacques Delors, the original initiator of the reforms, had wished for a reform 
of the CAP for a long time (Patterson, 1997). Furthermore the international pressure of 
the US and the GATT, and the prospect of political humiliation if no solution was found 
on these ongoing negotiations (Patterson, 1997), can be seen as part of a set of political 
preferences in the rationale of the MacSharry reform, gives the reform some 
characteristics of the super-systemic level. 
The empirical data we have does not enable us to place the reform process precisely on 
one of the three levels. As far as we can deduct there are different aspects of the reform 
that indicates that it fits on the different levels. 
 
3.2.2 The Policy Network of the MacSharry Reform     
The core members of the CAP network can be identified as being: COPA, national 
farmers’ unions, the Commissioner of Agriculture, the Commission Agricultural 
Directorate (DG VI) and the CoAM. The analysis of Daugbjerg (1997) suggests that there 
is a high degree of stability in the CAP objectives9. An actor such as the consumer unions 
(BEUC) is also a member of the network, but cannot be labelled as a core member, as 
consumers do not enjoy insider status and consequently cannot challenge the fundamental 
principles of the CAP. The above point is underlined by the fact that the top priority of 
the EU in the GATT negotiations were to defend and secure the continuation of the CAP. 
Although concessions were given and a reform was drafted, under contestation from 
COPA amongst others (chapter 3.1), the disagreement was not of fundamental character, 
and thus, did not challenge the overall consensus within the policy network: “…The 
conflict between the Commission and farmers was not over whether the EC should or 
                                                  
9
 These objectives are basically identified as being mechanisms to safeguard farmers from the free market 
forces and protecting family-run farms (Daubjerg, 1997). 
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should not subsidise agriculture, but over how it should be subsidised” (Daugbjerg; 
1997: 22). 
 
If we recall Blom-Hansen’s (2007) institutional rules of the policy network in figure 1. 
(chapter 2.1.5), we identified rules 1 (position), 2 (boundary), 4 (authority) and 6 
(information) as particular relevant for our analysis, reason being that these rules concern 
access and not influence, which it is not possible to investigate in the scope of this 
project.  
The analysis of the rules in connection to the MacSharry reform shows that we can 
exclude the dominant and decisive network as being characterized as a policy 
community. Firstly, we can establish that the position rule places COPA as merely an 
affected interest. This statement is somewhat derived from an analysis of the remaining 
three rules. The boundary rule, requiring mutual recognition opposed to free entry and 
exit of the network, will historically for the CAP go in favour of the policy community; 
As Kay states; “COPA has a role in the bureaucratic functioning of the extant CAP 
system. It usually has 50% of the membership of the Commission’s advisory, management 
and regulatory committees that exist for each of the CAP product regimes (Kay, 2000: 6). 
This limits the free entry and exit of the network. In the case of the MacSharry reform, 
however, COPA had not been involved nor informed of the reform (chapter 3.1.) why 
they were prohibited entry. This means that not even the loose connections of the issue 
network can be recognized. Concerning the rule of authority, co-operation vs. intrusion, 
we will later return to a deeper analysis (chapter 3.2.3) in which we can describe COPA 
as a possible intrusion to the policy goals of the MacSharry reform team and not a 
cooperative gain to the process. Simply put, the reform team was aware of COPA’s 
expected opposition, why the necessary co-operation of the policy community would 
skew the policy outcome in correspondence with the policy aims. Finally, the information 
rule, calling for exchange of expertise and judgement, also excludes a characterization of 
the network as a policy community. We can not say that the reform team did not take into 
consideration the information provided by COPA in previous situations, but no exchange 
of information can be detected in the particular situation, a claim substantiated by 
COPA’s initial unawareness of the reform plans (chapter 3.1). 
 50
Drawing on the descriptions concerning the events of the decision-making process of the 
MacSharry reform, we have in our scope of analysis empirically contested some of the 
rules governing the interaction between COPA and the Commission as characterized as a 
policy community. Hereby COPA’s possibility of gaining actual access to the decision-
makers is reduced as the role of the policy community has been de-emphasized. 
Subsequently, COPA’s institutionalised position as a core member of a policy 
community, with the privileges that entails, is reduced to that of an affected interest. 
 
3.2.3 The Commission’s Demand for Access Goods 
As introduced in chapter 2.1.3 the 
Commission, as the supranational drafter 
of legislation, would normally be in high 
demand of the access good EK from 
COPA or other IOs. However, as the 
MacSharry case show, the Commission 
chose to isolate itself from external 
influences, thus inhibiting its own 
opportunities for external provision of all 
three types of goods in the actual phase of 
drafting the reform. This apparent 
anomaly can possibly be explained by the 
content and context of the MacSharry 
reform process which accentuates the 
great degree of pressure for reform. 
Why COPA was confined from acting under the institutionalised rules of the policy 
community can be explained by the insights on the context of the MacSharry reform. 
Accepting that the dominant actors of the reform where certain of the overall policy 
goals, formulated through pressures over time, the exchange of expertise and judgements 
from members of the policy community seem obsolete.  
Box 1: Access Goods 
- “Expert Knowledge (EK): This access 
good concerns the expertise and technical 
know how needed from the private sector to 
understand the market.  
 - Information about the European 
Encompassing Interest (IEEI): This good 
concern the information needed from the 
private sector to help to define the European 
Encompassing Interest (EEI).  
- Information about the Domestic 
Encompassing interest (IDEI): This access 
good concerns the information needed from 
the private sector to help to define the 
Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI).  
(Bouwen, 2001) 
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As this project delimits itself to the immediate period of reform, our ability to detect the 
supplies of access goods provided by COPA is likewise narrowed. Seen in the light that 
the above mentioned pressures had intensified over time, we can not say that the IEEI 
provided by COPA had not been taken into consideration by the reform team, yet in the 
scope of time of this project and in the light of the above analyses, we can say that no real 
demand for IEEI was in need by the Commission. Neither does the fact that COPA, when 
learning of the existence of the reform plans, did not take the MacSharry proposal well 
(Klintgaard, 2007), exclude that the IEEI of COPA had influenced the Commission 
through its position as a member of the CAP policy community.  
 
Specifically concerning the Commission’s 
need for EK during the MacSharry drafting 
period, we know that the MacSharry group 
comprised a small team of highly specialized 
technocrats in the field of agriculture (box 2). 
The reform team itself was assisted by the 
MacSharry cabinet, with the exception of 
Larkin, head of cabinet and specialist in 
structural policy, which due to his 
specialisation did not have the required 
expertise on agricultural issues (Kay, 1998). 
With the discussion of policy networks in 
chapter 2.1.4 in mind, we describe the 
expanded reform team as an epistemic 
community. By creating a small and tightly 
defined reform team assisted by his own cabinet, Commissioner MacSharry managed to 
aid the development of shared beliefs and formal structures within the group of 
professionals, which again over the years of the work on the reform will institutionalize 
thus creating stability and increase effectiveness when linked to organisational goals (cf. 
Zucker, chapter 2.2). Due to the pressures building for reform of the CAP, the 
effectiveness of the small epistemic community might very well have seemed attractive 
Box 2: The Policy Network 
The MacSharry Reform Team 
MacSharry – Commissioner of Agriculture 
Hennesy – Deputy Chef de Cabinet MacSharry 
Legras – Director General of DG VI 
Demarty – Agricultural Policy Specialist, 
Cabinet de Delors 
 
Cabinet de MacSharry 
Larkin: Chef de Cabinet 
Hennesy: Deputy Chef de Cabinet 
MacDonagh & Verstayen: Worked on the 
construction of reform proposals 
Minch: Specialist in Uruguay Round issues 
(Kay, 1998) 
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to the Commissioner, well knowing that cutting the budget of support would not go down 
easy with COPA, and possibly threaten the reforms ability to sufficiently meet the 
demands of the pressures. It can therefore be said, that the policy community with COPA 
as a core member has been placed in the background due to the focus directed towards 
the advantages of the epistemic community. Besides offering stability and effectiveness, 
the epistemic community itself comprises expert knowledge accumulated over time thus 
in relative terms relieving the Commission of parts of its dependencies for external 
provision of EK at the time, but not from the important inclusion of the industries 
affected by legislation provided by a policy community  hence our discussion in chapter 
2.1.3.  
 
3.2.4 The Council’s Demand for Access Goods 
As the reform proposal was introduced to the Council on February 1st, 1991, a line of 
events came to show the intergovernmental nature of Council proceedings and the lever 
of national interests in EU politics.  
As established, the priority of access goods in demand by the Council goes as follows 
(Bouwen, 2001):  
1. Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest 
2. Information about the European Encompassing Interest 
3. Expert Knowledge 
The respective ranking of the goods can arguably change in certain situations of inter-
governmental bargaining where the need for strong argumentation promotes EK to a 
crucial access good, degrading IEEI as the good in lowest demand.  
IDEI is never the less strongly expressed in the preferences and positions of the members 
of CoAM negotiating the reform. A key element of conflict was the fact that the reform 
would alter the distribution of support under the CAP. Traditionally, the key principles 
governing the CAP were an even distribution based on production (Daubjerg, 2006). The 
MacSharry proposal introduced a change to support based on size, however with a wide-
ranging cut in the general level of subsidies by use of progressive differentiation. Besides 
overcoming the European budgetary problem, the reform should also limit the growing 
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economical gap between the majorities of inefficient and minority of very efficient 
farmers by transferring support from the efficient grain farms in northern Europe to the 
economically stressed small scale farms in the south (Patterson, 1997).  
 
Due to the regional differences in the size and efficiency of the farms the members of 
CoAM took stances, either for or against, based on their respective domestic 
encompassing interest (DEI) why the priority of the access goods were changed. The 
primary concerns of the UK and Germany were to be presented with increased 
expenditures. Also Germany’s domestic political environment due to the unification, and 
France’s domestic interest in safeguarding an unlimited ability of production in order to 
retain its position as a dominant exporter, were major obstacles to overcome. EK about 
national markets thus took over IEEI’s position as the good in highest demand, after 
IDEI, in order for CoAM to reach an agreement which considered national interests. The 
EK used in the Commission’s drafting of the reform had proven not to take the variations 
of the market into sufficient account across member states, why internal conflict over 
DEI created demand for domestic EK in order to adjust the reform to the individual 
markets. 
 
Having established the relevant demand for access goods, of the Commission and the 
Council, as well as the broader structural context of the MacSharry reform, we continue 
to our second element of analysis. 
 
3.3 Organizational Analysis 
This chapter provides an analysis of how COPA acted in influencing the decision-making 
process. The first part (chapter 3.3.1) analyses COPA’s organizational form and structure 
as well as the consequences it has for the type of access goods supplied by COPA. The 
second part (chapter 3.3.2) provides an analysis of how COPA’s formal procedures have 
become institutionalized and the effect this has on the provision of access goods as well 
as the influence it has on COPA’s ability to respond to novel problems. The final part 
(chapter 3.3.3) analyses COPA’s alternative routes of access outside the Commission. 
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Both the possible alternatives due to COPA’s institutionalized organizational form and 
structure and the efficiency of the attempted alternatives. The three chapters outlined 
above depart from the theoretical points summarized in chapter 2.2.3 and repeated below: 
 
• How can the formal structures and hierarchical organisational form of COPA –be 
understood by using our theories of organisational institutionalism? 
• Which type of access goods does COPA supply and how does that correspond to 
the EU institutions demand for access goods? 
• Has COPA’s internal decision-making procedures and routines been 
institutionalised? 
• Have COPA’s responses become institutionalised through routines and formal 
structures? 
• If the MacSharry reform anomaly falls outside COPA’s institutionalised set of 
responses, how do they respond to it? What options do they have due to their 
organisational structure and the current institutional political framework? 
 
3.3.1 The Organizational Structure 
COPA is a pan European association founded in 1958. It collectively represents the 
different national farmer’s organizations from the, in 1992, 12 member states as well as a 
row of associated and partner organizations from countries outside the EU. The 
organizational structure of COPA has not changed substantially over the last years and 
the few changes that have happened can be seen as a result of the changing political 
scenery prioritizing new issues such as the environment (Klintgaard, 2007; COPA, a, 
2007).  
COPA’s organizational form, and hence its formal and hierarchical structure, is organized 
with a Presidium, Presidency, Working Parties, General Experts Groups and COPA’s 
Secretariat. 
COPA’s policy originates in the specialized Working Parties which is where the members 
outline the discussions relevant to them. COPA has a large number of these Working 
Parties, each addressing specific issues related to the agricultural sector and examines all 
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matters concerning their field or sector. The Working Parties work on request by the 
President of COPA or the Presidium or investigate areas based on their own initiative 
(Clark et al, 2001; COPA, a, 2007). They then refer their standpoints to the General 
Experts Groups, which, if they find the issue and conclusion important, will draft a 
position paper and forward it to the Presidium (Clark et al, 2001). They also follow up on 
decisions made by the Presidium (COPA, a, 2007). 
The Presidium is the official policy-making body of COPA with one member from each 
member organisation; the President of CEJA10, the President of COGECA and the 
Chairman of COPA’s Women’s Committee. This is where all the activities are organised 
and the important coherent policy is agreed upon (COPA, a, 2007).  
COPA also has a Presidency, with one President and six Vice Presidents, which meet 
once a month. The Presidency reaches necessary agreements and subsequently defines 
COPA’s common positions (COPA, a, 2007). COPA’s Secretariat is assisting at all levels 
of COPA’s administrative hierarchy (Clark et al, 2001). 
 
COPA’s organisational form is a form that has relative few organisational layers, with an 
emphasis on an efficient division of labour through the Working Parties. The Presidium is 
structured around unanimous decisions and hence consensus is needed in order to make 
decisions and new standpoints (Clark et al, 2001). 
The member organisations have delegated competences to COPA, and though they retain 
the final influence through the Presidium, the organisation can function without a 
constant interaction between itself and its members. In other words, the daily handling of 
issues important to COPA is solved by the organisation itself without involving the 
member organisations (Klintgaard, 2007). The internal decision making procedures are, 
due to the open but hierarchical structure of the organisation, also relatively simple and 
well defined. Different Working Parties have their respective areas of expertise and they 
are supervised directly by the General Experts Groups and subsequently the Presidency 
(Bouwen, 2001). 
 
                                                  
10
 European Council of Young Farmers 
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From the organizational structures of COPA we are able to derive how the organization is 
able to service all policy-making organizations of the EU.  
The IDEI is mainly provided to the EU from the individual members’ of COPA who have 
the ability to accumulate and formulate national interests and supply them directly to 
their respective national governments as exemplified by the Danish Agricultural 
Council’s position paper on the MacSharry reform (Landbrugsrådet, a, 1991) and later 
resolution (Landbrugsrådet, b, 1991). As expressed by COPA’s director of strategy: “our 
member organisations like to be masters of their own countries, they don’t like very much 
for COPA to interfere” (Clark et al, 2001: 96). This mechanism also overcomes 
difficulties of navigating in the changing national political environments across the EU 
where different attitudes and approaches towards interest representation can be observed. 
Some national organizations might have strong formally institutionalized relations to the 
government while others are based on more pluralist or static models.  
As mentioned, COPA’s Presidium decides through unanimity which has consequences 
for its abilities to supply IEEI. Though COPA as a European peak association probably 
has the best possibilities of accumulation IEEI, the decision-making procedures will 
inevitably hamper its speed and efficiency in the provision. This, however, may not be all 
bad. Previously we have established that COPA historically is benefited with a formal 
institutionalized role in the tightly knit policy community of the CAP. The fact that 
COPA decides by unanimity might hamper its speed and flexibility yet it will strongly 
increase its credibility as the IEEI provided by COPA is consolidated by the unanimity 
and its representativity. Further, it can be argued to which extend COPA, in a normal 
scenario of policy-making, is in need of speed and flexibility, when being part of the 
policy community which enables them to not only influence but tightly monitor current 
affairs within the policy-making organizations over long periods of time.  
In Bouwen’s terms, COPA is therefore capable of supplying high qualities and quantities 
of IEEI with little speed and flexibility however. 
When it comes to the access good EK, COPA’s organizational structure on the contrary 
displays high levels of efficiency and flexibility. That COPA has a large number of semi-
autonomous departments of research and development which by own initiative can 
engage in relevant issues mean that the decision-making process in acquiring EK is 
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simplified. It is also expected that COPA possess the economic and academic resources 
required to perform the in-depth research and analysis required for strong quality and 
quantity of EK.  
According to theory, COPA should therefore display abilities to meet the Commission’s 
crucial demand for EK and the Parliament’s11 crucial demand for IEEI while the 
individual members of the organization are capable of lobbying their IDEI towards 
respective governments.  
In this light, we must conclude that COPA’s most prominent resources to offer the EU is 
EK due to its flexibility and efficiency and secondly IEEI due to the credibility of a 
unanimous body of European farmers’ organizations.   
  
3.3.2 Changing the Scenery - COPA and the Commission 
Part of the formal structures that COPA has developed has been a very close relationship 
with the Commissioners of Agriculture. The Commission has always been COPA’s 
favourite target for lobbying and COPA has benefited from the strong bonds to the DG 
VI (Clark et al, 2001; COPA, a, 2007), i.e. the previously established point of COPA 
holding up to 50% of the seats in the committees under the Commission (Kay, 2000; 
chapter 3.2.2). Under usual circumstances, whenever the Commission takes a decision 
relating to the CAP, they would have consulted COPA several times through these formal 
advisory, management and regulatory committees. COPA is therefore an integrated part 
of Commission’s standard operating procedure wherefore the break off in cooperation 
seems even odder from COPA’s point of view.  
The normal dependency between COPA and the Commission obviously also works the 
other way around meaning that these formalized procedures through the advisory, 
management and regulatory committees form a strong basis for an institutionalization of 
how COPA addresses the Commission and therefore how they attempt to offload their 
access goods. In this instance the Commission function as the environment under which 
COPA institutionalizes its procedures and routines. The interaction with the Commission 
both functions as what Zucker (1987) describes as an organized pattern of action, and as 
                                                  
11
 According to Bouwen (2001) the crucial access good for the EP, is IEEI. The EP though, is not dealt with 
directly within the scope of this project. 
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being embedded in the formal structures of the system. Though the Commission provides 
the environment in which COPA specifically adapts in the case of the MacSharry reform, 
the way in which it adapts is also determined by the organization as the institutionalizing 
element. 
These formal structures of a closely knit cooperation between COPA and the 
Commission through the formal advisory, management and regulatory committees, will 
presumably also result in a set of institutionalised responses (Suchman, 1995). Besides 
these formal structures, it is to be expected qua the length of the history of COPA and the 
CAP’s development, stretching back to the inception of COPA as an organisation, that 
the close cooperation through the formal structures has provided opportunities for 
informal routines to arise (Zucker, 1987). These informal routines will further the 
institutionalisation of the responses, alongside the formal structures. 
The effect of this institutionalisation of COPA’s responses can be seen as an increased 
efficiency through routines that reduce the search and evaluation costs (Zucker, 1987). 
This increased efficiency, further strengthens COPA’s supply of EK, but the cost that is 
paid is that the institutionalised response might be used even if more efficient alternatives 
exist outside the institutionalised set of responses (Zucker, 1987; Suchman, 1995). 
This dependent relationship started to change with the MacSharry reform process as the 
Commission distanced themselves from COPA, primarily through changing the 
formalised procedure they had used for many years (Clark et al, 2001). It is therefore 
interesting to analyse how COPA responds to this change. The distancing of the 
Commission left COPA behind, still being dependant on the former close relationship as 
they thought the before so strong bonds were still existing. COPA therefore lulled it self 
into a feeling of security, still relying on the before so solid routines. COPA’s difficulties 
in formulating a common position towards the initial reform proposal even further 
decreased the Commission’s dependency 
; “COPA’s administrative hierarchy seemed unable or unwilling, to acknowledge its 
diminished lobbying influence” (Clark et al, 2001: 86-87) and “for many Commission 
officials, COPA’s arguments have remained unchanged and do not show that they are 
dealing reasonably with the reality of oversupply [or] budgetary crisis”  
(Clark et al, 2001: 88).  
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The Commission was, due to the exhaustive insight in COPA’s organizational behaviour 
and preferences, able to consider other alternatives (Clark et al, 2001). This is illustrated 
by the epistemic community (chapter 3.2.2) the Commission chose to rely on in the initial 
reform phase, leaving COPA in the dark. This was as explained (chapter 3.2.2) due to the 
resistance and rigidity of COPA, making the Commission unable to include COPA, as it 
was obvious that they would block for any radical changes and could therefore not be a 
part of the epistemic community. 
The organisational form of COPA is well functioning under normal conditions with the 
active use of the CAP policy community where they are a core member, but as soon as 
new approaches need to be considered, and novel problems arise, COPA’s principle of 
unanimity becomes a hindrance (cf. Zucker, 1987; Suchman, 1995; Clark et al, 2001). 
The internal position process slows down and “the difficulty is not only getting a common 
position, but getting it together in good time” (Clark et al, 2001: 84).  
 
Subsequently it is interesting to analyse how COPA responded to the exclusion from the 
decision-making process, and whether they had any alternative options available due to 
the institutionalized relationship with the Commission. Which possibilities do they have 
if they wish to seek alternative routes for gaining access?  
 
3.3.3 Alternative Routes to Access? 
When analyzing COPA’s opportunities for seeking influence despite of the anomaly 
identified in the MacSharry reform process, its apparently institutionalised methods of 
working is important to take into account to understand their options for seeking 
influence in the process.  
We argue that through the formal structural procedures of the CAP-COPA relationship, 
and through the development of routines due to the length of history between the two, 
COPA’s responses to a given scenario have become institutionalised. Hence we need to 
determine which type of problem the MacSharry reform posses for COPA, and how they 
select to handle it.  
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With the Commission normally being the most important partner for COPA, and as 
COPA’s organisational form is geared towards delivering the access good EK, they are 
facing a novel problem because of the institutionalisation of their responses around this 
supply of and demand for EK, normally structured by the policy community.  
Focussing on this specific institution normally makes perfect sense since once the 
proposal has left the Commission it becomes too late to influence the basic content of the 
proposal (Clark et al, 2001). In the MacSharry process this entails that they are kept from 
supplying their EK. Council needs IDEI, so COPA can not simply move their supply of 
EK to another institution. Though COPA has standard operating procedures for 
attempting to gain access to the Council (Clark et al, 2001; COPA, a, 2007) their 
organisational form entails that they are not adapted to supplying a high level of IDEI. 
COPA is, as earlier described good at IEEI, but this is of no real use, since the EP has no 
direct influence on agricultural proposals.  
 
It is hard to tell whether COPA recognised the problem as fundamental or not. The fact 
that COPA’s secretariat still thought the special relationship with the DG VI was intact 
indicates that COPA was not aware of the new situation, or if they were aware, that they 
misconceived the problem (Suchman, 1995; Clark et al, 2001). Looking at how they 
chose to handle the problem after the proposal paper left the Commission. The first 
reaction we see from COPA, after becoming aware of the leaked document, is that COPA 
President at the time, Constantin Heereman, went to see Rene Steichen, the then 
President of the CoAM. The COPA President presented his concerns, as he thought that 
the planned reform would increase the cost and bureaucracy for the farmers and force 
them to increase production, at a time when a decrease was needed (AgraEurope, January 
25, 1991, E/4). 
COPA then released a position paper in May 1991 expressing their overall disapproval of 
the reform (COPA, 1991). Saying that the reform: "will not solve the present problems 
facing farmers and the farm sector”. COPA also criticized the Commission's proposals as 
being; “misplaced and ineffective and a threat to the existence of very many family 
farms” (AgraEurope, February 14, 1991, E/4). This position paper ended up working as 
general assumptions concerning COPA’s view on the conditions for the agricultural 
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sector. They wanted to maintain the existing policy and secure compensation to farmers 
suffering from income losses (Daugbjerg, 1997). The information they presented 
therefore had the characteristics of IEEI and ended up displaying no significant influence 
on the position of CoAM. In this manner it is important to point to the fact that the 
CoAM President, being the head of the Council General Secretariat, has a need for IEEI 
to help ensure the development during the chairmanship. However the Council General 
Secretariat is neither a dominant bargaining actor nor voting in the CoAM and therefore 
has no real influence as the other members of the Council had their national agendas and 
IDEI to consider.  
The main explanation for a lack of influence can be seen as a result of COPA’s specific 
organisational structure. COPA normally leaves the lobbying of the Council to the 
individual member organisations as they are better at producing the needed IDEI and has 
contacts at the national level. As stated; “National governments highly value their contact 
with national farmers’ organizations and find that it is an important channel for public 
support. In fact, national governments seem to value the exchange of resources with 
national farmers’ organizations even more than is the case the other way around” 
(Lynggaard, 2001: 17). Hence both the member organizations of COPA and the members 
of CoAM prefer to deal with each other directly, without COPA interfering in the 
process, as expressed by COPA’s director of strategy (cf. chapter 3.3.1) which obviously 
complicates COPA addressing anything significant to the CoAM directly. COPA still 
managed to present common positions, but they had to be made in accordance to the 
national position papers of the member organisations outlined at the time, why the 
common positions were very limited in scope (Clark et al, 2001).    
 
Still it is interesting to consider if the contact to CoAM’s president, and the release of the 
position paper, can be seen as an attempt to acknowledge the problem and search for an 
appropriate response. COPA’s position paper acknowledged a need for a change such as 
a reform however the overall position remained negative towards the MacSharry proposal 
(Agra Europe, May 29, 1991 E/1). COPA’s strategy therefore remained unchanged 
throughout the MacSharry reform process. The reliance on the previously closely knit 
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bonds to the Commission and the member organisations first right to lobby the ministers 
of the CoAM made it very difficult if not impossible to lobby it positions. 
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4 Conclusion 
 
Below we make the final concluding remarks of the project addressing and answering the 
question we posed for ourselves in our problem formulation (chapter 1.1) which reads as 
follows: 
 
“What opportunities did COPA have of influencing the drafting of the MacSharry reform, 
when their usual access to the Commission was cut off?” 
 
All though being identified as a core member of the policy community of the CAP, and 
thus usually having relatively well institutionalized ways of accessing the decision-
making process we conclude, that during the MacSharry reform process, COPA had few 
opportunities of influencing the drafting of the reform, and was unable to adjust to the 
new circumstances of the Commission, which chose to rely on its own EK through the 
creation of an epistemic community.  
 
As outlined, COPA’s organizational form and structure entailed that their usual and 
strongest access good was a supply of EK to the Commission (chapter 3.3.1). In this case, 
due to internal and external pressures for reform (chapter 3.1; chapter 3.2.1) the reform 
team in the Commission constituted an epistemic community, hence the Commission 
supplied its own EK, making COPA’s supply redundant (chapter 3.2.3).  
COPA’s opportunity for influencing the Council is somewhat reduced as the national 
ministers of agriculture and thereby CoAM’s demand for access goods was IDEI, 
supplied from national farm organizations (chapter 3.2.3; 3.3.3). COPA was therefore 
unable to supply the types of access goods that were in demand by the decision-makers 
during the MacSharry reform.  
The institutionalization of COPA’s structures and procedures meant that their possible 
responses had also become institutionalized, which limited them in their opportunities to 
effectively seek alternative routes of influence (chapter 3.3.2). The fact that COPA 
apparently did not acquire an access good in demand and did not fully realize that their 
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usual cooperation with the DG VI had been cut off meant that they misconceived the 
problem they were facing, which further contributed to their failure in finding alternative 
routes of access.  
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5 Limitations 
 
The choice of overall scientific and methodological stance always creates a string of 
limitations that one has to be aware of when concluding on the research. This chapter’s 
aim is to point out which of these limitations this project entails and briefly discuss 
potential solutions to them. 
 
We have chosen to place our project within the paradigm of critical theory. Consequently 
we place ourselves between the positivist and the constructivist paradigm which in 
essence represents the two poles of philosophy of science. In effect we have chosen our 
theories by their abilities explanandum instead of their relation to ontological and 
epistemological underlying bases which possibly challenge the consistency of our 
project. This point is sought accommodated in our deductive analysis of the empirical and 
theoretical points in chapter 3.  
 
Because of our focus on formal decision making powers in the political system of the EU, 
we delimited ourselves from including the parliaments in the analysis. However, an 
analysis incorporating the normative decision making structures must include the 
Parliament as it enjoys a good brokerage position for operational agricultural policy 
(Pappi et Henning, 1999).   
Our method has been put together with emphasis on the explanatory weight of a 
theoretical exploration. Under ideal circumstances we as researchers would conduct our 
own field research and subsequently construct our own concepts and ideas on the topic 
weighed against collected empirical data. Our conclusion needs to be considered with the 
stipulation that we have had to prioritize our focus in a few areas.  
The time span that has lapsed between this project and the case analyzed is possibly the 
largest limiting factor we have faced. The 15 years that has passed means that a lot of the 
primary data is simply not available in public space. This has lead directly to another 
limitation which has to be addressed; our dependency on secondary accounts when it 
comes to empirical data. Using secondary sources for our analyses raises the problem of 
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double contingency. First of all we have to rely on the researchers’ correct collection and 
interpretation of their own data, secondly the fact that we ourselves interpret the data 
presented. This should be taken as a reservation concerning the internal validity of our 
conclusions. 
The primary sources we have collected through official and private documents, as well as 
the weekly report AgraEurope, also reduce the representativeness of our sources. Ideally 
we would have made a more thorough analysis by using other media sources from the 
time instead of relying on a single source. Though we have attempted to cover for some 
of these problems by conducting an explorative interview with Ole Klintgaard, the 
interview suffers from the same possible flaw, acknowledging that it can be difficult to 
remember the exact details for a period that lies so far behind. 
The limited amount of empirical data available in the public space makes it difficult to 
contest some of the theoretical claims of the project, especially concerning intra 
organizational elements.  
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6 Reflections 
 
The MacSharry reform turned out to be, although relatively moderate, one of the most 
radical reforms of the CAP since its establishment. The great degree of pressure 
internally as well as externally for an extensive reform made the Commission set aside 
normal procedures for decision-making and instead relied on its own judgment. Given 
that the stability of the CAP regime could be explained by the conservative nature of the 
cohesive policy community usually involved in decision-making, this can be seen as a 
necessary choice if the ever growing agricultural spending should finally come to a halt. 
It is never the less among these political factors at the macro level that we best explain 
why the MacSharry reform process ended up with the result it did.  
In this perspective a peak lobbying organization such as COPA does not play a 
significant part, and we could in this light note that our theories concerning possibilities 
for access to the decision-makers of the EU are challenged in relation to their explanatory 
power. In the long term it might be more appropriate to look at the effectiveness of the 
interest organisation in developing different kinds of information, yet in the short term 
this approach has its limitations as it becomes extremely difficult to assess whether or not 
problems of gaining access are to be found at different levels of analysis. By assuming 
from the start that the EU institutions in all cases are equally interested in information 
from IOs, one can quickly run into problems trying to analyze empirical data which in the 
case of interest representation point in various directions and end up pointing at the 
wrong mechanisms.   
As an example it is worth considering whether a highly politically charged subject such 
as a CAP reform does temper with the fundamental assumption of a theory stressing the 
intra organizational aspect of an IO. Instead one could focus on the actors and which 
powers they possessed individually, for example by examining the process from the point 
of national IOs as the important final decision lies with the CoAM, or by looking at the 
whole process with a top-down perspective emphasizing the formal institutions and their 
politicians needs in coping with a politically sensitive agenda.   
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A multilevel system such as that of the EU opens up more channels for influence than is 
the case for unitary systems and evidently an IO cannot rely on one of these routes as the 
demand for their activity is varies (Pappi et Henning, 1999). It could seem as if this 
constitutes a problem for COPA as it, due to its fundamental organizational form, 
structure and history, is confined to supplying EK and IEEI to the EU policy making 
organizations. The appropriateness of viewing COPA as a single individual actor can also 
be discussed. An alternative perspective might be that the European agricultural lobby is 
seen as a system or network of Euro-farmers, in which COPA’s sole purpose and 
capabilities in only addressing parts of the EU decision-makers is justified in light of a 
division of competences between the individual farmers, the national organizations and 
COPA. COPA interfering with the intergovernmental bargaining of the National 
Agricultural Ministers could be seen as untimely from the perspective of the national 
interest organizations. A point which interestingly enough relates to the overall question 
of to which degree the EU can be considered an intergovernmental institution or a classic 
federation, and discussions on spillover mechanisms and the Europeanization of the IOs.   
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